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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0264: OopsIE

OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. [1]

EnterpriseS0264MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0264: OopsIE describes [OopsIE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0264) is a Trojan used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)

Executive priority

S0264: OopsIE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0264: OopsIE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0264: OopsIE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

OopsIE

OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

OopsIE exfiltrates command output and collected files to its C2 server in 1500-byte blocks.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

OopsIE concatenates then decompresses multiple resources to load an embedded .Net Framework assembly.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

OopsIE has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

OopsIE uses WMI to perform discovery techniques.[2]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

OopsIE encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature to check the temperature to see if it’s running in a virtual environment.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

OopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

OopsIE uses the command prompt to execute commands on the victim's machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

OopsIE compresses collected files with a simple character replacement scheme before sending them to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

OopsIE can download files from its C2 server to the victim's machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

OopsIE creates and uses a VBScript as part of its persistent execution.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

OopsIE compresses collected files with GZipStream before sending them to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with "Daylight" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

OopsIE uses the Confuser protector to obfuscate an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2. OopsIE also encodes collected data in hexadecimal format before writing to files on disk and obfuscates strings.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0049: OilRigEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1030: Data Transfer Size LimitsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.003: Archive via Custom MethodEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.001: Archive via UtilityEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
75a1635b9bf3b3ab...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle75a1635b9bf3…
19.11.2Older bundle75a1635b9bf3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    OopsIE

    (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0264
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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