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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0264: OopsIE

OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. [1]

EnterpriseS0264MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

OopsIE is a Windows Trojan associated in ATT&CK with OilRig and described as enabling remote command execution plus file upload and download. Its business significance is not the malware name itself, but the operating pattern it represents: hands-on command execution, staging, compression or custom archiving, and exfiltration over command-and-control traffic. For leaders, this is a readiness test for whether Windows endpoint, command-line, WMI, scheduled task, and web-protocol telemetry can support fast containment and evidence-based incident decisions.

Executive priority

Treat OopsIE as a useful benchmark for resilience against targeted intrusion tradecraft tied to remote execution and data movement. Priority questions are: can the organization prove visibility into suspicious Windows command execution, WMI use, scheduled tasks, file staging, archiving, deletion, and outbound web-based C2-like traffic; can incident responders reconstruct upload/download activity; and are controls tuned to detect data exfiltration that may occur in chunks or over an existing C2 channel? This is especially relevant for sectors similar to those described in the related OilRig context, including government, financial, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, but local exposure must be determined from the organization’s own environment.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for OopsIE, so defenders should build coverage from the related behaviors. On Windows, validate telemetry and detections for Windows Command Shell, Visual Basic execution, WMI abuse, scheduled task creation or execution, system and time discovery, local data staging, archive creation via utilities or custom methods, file deletion, tool transfer, standard encoding, packed or obfuscated files, deobfuscation activity, and web-protocol command-and-control with possible exfiltration over the same channel. Detection engineering should correlate host process activity with network sessions and file activity rather than relying only on malware signatures, because the relationship set includes obfuscation, packing, encoding, and anti-analysis system checks.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line arguments
  • WMI activity and remote/local management events
  • Scheduled task creation, modification, and execution events
  • File creation, modification, staging, archive creation, and deletion events
  • Endpoint malware/EDR observations for packed, obfuscated, or decoded content

Detection direction

  • Because ATT&CK lists no official OopsIE detection guidance, validate behavior-based analytics mapped to the related techniques rather than a single indicator set.
  • Correlate command shell, VB, WMI, and scheduled task activity with unusual parent processes, new files, outbound web connections, and follow-on staging or archiving.
  • Tune for legitimate administration noise: WMI, scheduled tasks, command shell, compression utilities, and web traffic are common, so detections should consider user, host role, timing, process lineage, and destination reputation or novelty.
  • Look for exfiltration patterns that may not exceed simple volume thresholds, including fixed-size chunks or data sent over the same channel used for command and control.
  • Account for blind spots from obfuscation, software packing, standard encoding, file deletion, and system checks that may reduce static analysis or sandbox reliability.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize Windows endpoint visibility for process, command-line, WMI, scheduled task, file, and network activity before relying on narrow malware signatures.
  • Harden and monitor administrative execution paths such as WMI, command shell usage, scripting/VB execution, and scheduled task creation according to business need.
  • Apply least privilege and execution control practices to reduce unauthorized command execution, tool transfer, staging, and persistence opportunities.
  • Control and monitor outbound web traffic so unusual destinations, encoded payloads, upload/download patterns, and C2-like sessions can be investigated.
  • Ensure incident response playbooks include collection of volatile process context, staged files or archives, deleted-file evidence where available, and proxy/network logs needed to confirm exfiltration scope.
Additional notes and limits

The strongest defensive value comes from treating OopsIE as a cluster of observable behaviors: remote command execution, file transfer, staging, archiving, exfiltration over C2, and stealth through obfuscation, packing, encoding, deletion, and anti-analysis checks. The ATT&CK relationship to OilRig provides threat-intelligence context, but response prioritization should be based on local asset criticality, telemetry availability, and whether similar behaviors appear in the environment.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, no aliases, and no malware-level tactics specified. The platform explicitly supplied for OopsIE is Windows. Technique relationships provide behavior context, but they do not by themselves prove current activity, exposure, or detection coverage in any specific environment.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

OopsIE

OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

OopsIE exfiltrates command output and collected files to its C2 server in 1500-byte blocks.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

OopsIE concatenates then decompresses multiple resources to load an embedded .Net Framework assembly.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

OopsIE has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

OopsIE uses WMI to perform discovery techniques.[2]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

OopsIE encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature to check the temperature to see if it’s running in a virtual environment.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

OopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

OopsIE uses the command prompt to execute commands on the victim's machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

OopsIE compresses collected files with a simple character replacement scheme before sending them to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

OopsIE can download files from its C2 server to the victim's machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

OopsIE creates and uses a VBScript as part of its persistent execution.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

OopsIE compresses collected files with GZipStream before sending them to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with "Daylight" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

OopsIE uses the Confuser protector to obfuscate an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2. OopsIE also encodes collected data in hexadecimal format before writing to files on disk and obfuscates strings.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1030: Data Transfer Size LimitsEnterpriseuses · GroupG0049: OilRigEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.003: Archive via Custom MethodEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.001: Archive via UtilityEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
75a1635b9bf3b3ab...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundle75a1635b9bf3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    OopsIE

    (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)

  4. [4]
    OopsIE

    (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)

  5. [5]
    OopsIE

    (Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)

  6. [6]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS0264
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS0264
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS0264
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
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