S0259: InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. InnaputRAT has been seen out in the wild since 2016. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0259: InnaputRAT describes [InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. [InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) has been seen out in the wild since 2016. (Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)
Executive priority
S0259: InnaputRAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0259: InnaputRAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0259: InnaputRAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. InnaputRAT has been seen out in the wild since 2016. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | InnaputRAT launches a shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | InnaputRAT gathers system information.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | InnaputRAT uses an 8-byte XOR key to obfuscate API names and other strings contained in the payload.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | InnaputRAT has a command to delete files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | InnaputRAT enumerates directories and obtains file attributes on a system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | InnaputRAT uses the API call ShellExecuteW for execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by adding a new service named OfficeUpdateService.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | Some InnaputRAT variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | InnaputRAT gathers volume drive information.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by using the file names SafeApp.exe and NeutralApp.exe.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 1881ca1bfff9… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 1881ca1bfff9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018
ASERT Team. (2018, April 04). Innaput Actors Utilize Remote Access Trojan Since 2016, Presumably Targeting Victim Files. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]InnaputRAT
(Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackS0259Open source URL
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