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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0168: Gazer

Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. [1]

EnterpriseS0168MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Gazer matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Windows backdoor associated with Turla and links it to persistence, stealth, and encrypted command-and-control behaviors. For leaders, the decision value is not a single malware name; it is whether the organization can prove it would notice a quiet Windows backdoor that persists through logon/startup mechanisms, hides artifacts, injects into processes, and communicates over web protocols with additional encryption.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and evidence question: can the SOC and IR teams demonstrate visibility into Windows persistence changes, suspicious process behavior, file hiding/deletion, and encrypted outbound web traffic? Because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for Gazer, leadership should ask for coverage evidence mapped to the related techniques rather than assuming malware-signature detection is sufficient.

Technical view

Validate controls against the ATT&CK relationships for S0168: Windows scheduled tasks, Registry Run keys/startup folders, Winlogon helper DLL changes, screensaver-based persistence, shortcut modification, process injection/thread execution hijacking, timestomping, file deletion, NTFS file attribute abuse, encoded/encrypted files, user discovery, ingress tool transfer, mutex-based execution constraints, and encrypted C2 over web protocols. Treat this as a Windows endpoint plus network-detection use case, with special attention to behaviors that can blend into normal administration or ordinary HTTPS traffic.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and parent/child process telemetry
  • Windows registry auditing for Run keys, Winlogon paths, startup persistence, and screensaver configuration
  • Scheduled task creation/modification events
  • File creation, deletion, timestamp, shortcut, .scr, DLL, and NTFS attribute/alternate data stream evidence
  • Process injection or memory-behavior telemetry from EDR where available

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on an official Gazer detection analytic; ATT&CK does not provide one for this object.
  • Map detections to the related techniques and test whether Windows persistence changes are visible and triaged with useful context.
  • Tune for administrative false positives: scheduled tasks, Run keys, shortcuts, and signed binaries are common, so detections should consider rarity, path, signer, user context, timing, and correlated process/network activity.
  • Correlate stealth signals such as timestomping, file deletion, NTFS attribute abuse, encoded files, and process injection rather than alerting on each weak signal in isolation.
  • Review outbound web traffic for unusual destinations, beacon-like patterns, or encrypted payload behavior, while recognizing that encrypted C2 may limit content inspection.

Mitigation priorities

  • Harden and monitor Windows persistence surfaces: scheduled tasks, startup folders, Run keys, Winlogon helper paths, screensaver execution, and shortcut locations.
  • Apply least privilege and change control around registry locations and startup mechanisms that enable persistence or privilege escalation.
  • Maintain endpoint protection/EDR coverage capable of recording process, file, registry, and memory-behavior signals relevant to injection and stealth.
  • Restrict and monitor unauthorized tool transfer and suspicious outbound web communications through egress controls, proxy logging, and DNS visibility.
  • Strengthen code-signing validation processes, but do not treat a valid signature alone as proof of trust because ATT&CK links this object to code-signing abuse.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies Gazer as a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016 and notes WhiteBear is assessed in the references as the same as S0168. The strongest defensive value comes from the technique relationships, especially Windows persistence, stealth, process injection, and encrypted web-based C2. Local baselining is essential because several behaviors overlap with normal administration.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text and no object-level tactics. This take is limited to the supplied Windows platform, official description, external references, and listed relationships; it does not assert current activity, victim exposure, guaranteed detection, or attribution for any specific incident.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Gazer

Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by setting the value “Shell” with “explorer.exe, %malware_pathfile%” under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

For early Gazer versions, the compilation timestamp was faked.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses RSA.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Gazer communicates with its C2 servers over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu or by modifying existing .lnk files to execute the malware through cmd.exe.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Gazer has commands to delete files and persistence mechanisms from the victim.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055.003Thread Execution HijackingSub-technique

Gazer performs thread execution hijacking to inject its orchestrator into a running thread from a remote process.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Gazer injects its communication module into an Internet accessible process through which it performs C2.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Gazer can execute a task to download a file.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses 3DES.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1546.002ScreensaverSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence through the system screensaver by configuring it to execute the malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Gazer versions are signed with various valid certificates; one was likely faked and issued by Comodo for "Solid Loop Ltd," and another was issued for "Ultimate Computer Support Ltd."[1][2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Gazer obtains the current user's security identifier.[2]

EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-technique

Gazer stores configuration items in alternate data streams (ADSs) if the Registry is not accessible.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Gazer logs its actions into files that are encrypted with 3DES. It also uses RSA to encrypt resources.[2]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

Gazer creates a mutex using the hard-coded value `{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.003: Thread Execution HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.002: ScreensaverEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.004: NTFS File AttributesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480.002: Mutual ExclusionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d7580c6bba94db5d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.3Current bundled7580c6bba94…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET Crutch December 2020

    Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    ESET Crutch December 2020

    Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    ESET Crutch December 2020

    Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Gazer

    (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)

  9. [9]
    Gazer

    (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)

  10. [10]
    Gazer

    (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)

  11. [11]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    WhiteBear

    The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

  14. [14]
    WhiteBear

    The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

  15. [15]
    WhiteBear

    The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

  16. [16]
    mitre-attackS0168
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    mitre-attackS0168
    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    mitre-attackS0168
    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  67. [67]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  68. [68]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  69. [69]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  70. [70]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  71. [71]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  72. [72]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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