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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0168: Gazer

Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. [1]

EnterpriseS0168MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0168: Gazer describes [Gazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168) is a backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)

Executive priority

S0168: Gazer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0168: Gazer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0168: Gazer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Gazer

Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by setting the value “Shell” with “explorer.exe, %malware_pathfile%” under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

For early Gazer versions, the compilation timestamp was faked.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses RSA.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Gazer communicates with its C2 servers over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu or by modifying existing .lnk files to execute the malware through cmd.exe.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Gazer has commands to delete files and persistence mechanisms from the victim.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055.003Thread Execution HijackingSub-technique

Gazer performs thread execution hijacking to inject its orchestrator into a running thread from a remote process.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Gazer injects its communication module into an Internet accessible process through which it performs C2.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Gazer can execute a task to download a file.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses 3DES.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1546.002ScreensaverSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence through the system screensaver by configuring it to execute the malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Gazer versions are signed with various valid certificates; one was likely faked and issued by Comodo for "Solid Loop Ltd," and another was issued for "Ultimate Computer Support Ltd."[1][2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Gazer obtains the current user's security identifier.[2]

EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-technique

Gazer stores configuration items in alternate data streams (ADSs) if the Registry is not accessible.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Gazer logs its actions into files that are encrypted with 3DES. It also uses RSA to encrypt resources.[2]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

Gazer creates a mutex using the hard-coded value `{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.003: Thread Execution HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.002: ScreensaverEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.004: NTFS File AttributesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480.002: Mutual ExclusionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d7580c6bba94db5d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundled7580c6bba94…
19.11.3Older bundled7580c6bba94…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Gazer Aug 2017

    ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET Crutch December 2020

    Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Gazer

    (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)

  5. [5]
    WhiteBear

    The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0168
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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