S0159: SNUGRIDE
Automated summary not available
Glexia publishes ATT&CK takes only after source-hash and schema validation. Until then, use the official MITRE definition below and the defensive relationship context on this page.
SNUGRIDE
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0045: menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | dba3e74c1797… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | dba3e74c1797… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | dba3e74c1797… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye APT10 April 2017
FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]SNUGRIDE
(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)
- [3]mitre-attackS0159Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
