S0147: Pteranodon
Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0147: Pteranodon describes [Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) is a custom backdoor used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047). (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)
Executive priority
S0147: Pteranodon is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0147: Pteranodon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0147: Pteranodon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Pteranodon
Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | Pteranodon can capture screenshots at a configurable interval.[1]CitationUnit 42 Gamaredon February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Pteranodon can use `cmd.exe` for execution on victim systems.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Pteranodon has used various API calls.CitationMicrosoft Actinium February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Pteranodon can download and execute additional files.[1][2]CitationUnit 42 Gamaredon February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Pteranodon can use HTTP for C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Pteranodon identifies files matching certain file extension and copies them to subdirectories it created.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Pteranodon can decrypt encrypted data strings prior to using them.CitationMicrosoft Actinium February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | Pteranodon can use a dynamic Windows hashing algorithm to map API components.CitationMicrosoft Actinium February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | Pteranodon can use a malicious VBS file for execution.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | Pteranodon executes functions using rundll32.exe.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Pteranodon can delete files that may interfere with it executing. It also can delete temporary files and itself after the initial script executes.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under |
| Enterprise | T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.CitationUnit 42 Gamaredon February 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1218.005 | MshtaSub-technique | Pteranodon can use mshta.exe to execute an HTA file hosted on a remote server.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | Pteranodon schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.[1][2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0047: Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.1 | Current bundle | 80be6ca8a27f… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Older bundle | 80be6ca8a27f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017
Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]Symantec Shuckworm January 2022
Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile
Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]Pterodo
(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)
- [5]mitre-attackS0147Open source URL
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