S0131: TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. [1]
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TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | TINYTYPHON has used XOR with 0x90 to obfuscate its configuration file.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | TINYTYPHON searches through the drive containing the OS, then all drive letters C through to Z, for documents matching certain extensions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | When a document is found matching one of the extensions in the configuration, TINYTYPHON uploads it to the C2 server.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0040: Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | db37ae70c4e3… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | db37ae70c4e3… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | db37ae70c4e3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Forcepoint Monsoon
Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0131Open source URL
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