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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0127: BBSRAT

BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. [1]

EnterpriseS0127MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0127: BBSRAT describes [BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

Executive priority

S0127: BBSRAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0127: BBSRAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0127: BBSRAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

BBSRAT

BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

BBSRAT uses Expand to decompress a CAB file into executable content.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.002Archive via LibrarySub-technique

BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe.

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

BBSRAT can query service configuration information.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

BBSRAT can start, stop, or delete services.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

BBSRAT uses GET and POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to obtain commands and send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

BBSRAT uses a custom encryption algorithm on data sent back to the C2 server over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.015Component Object Model HijackingSub-technique

BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1} depending on the system's CPU architecture.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

BBSRAT can list file and directory information.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

BBSRAT can delete files and directories.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

BBSRAT can modify service configurations.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

BBSRAT can list running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

BBSRAT has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.002: Archive via LibraryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.015: Component Object Model HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.012: Process HollowingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7b490ac8c2443ef6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle7b490ac8c244…
19.11.2Older bundle7b490ac8c244…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT

    Lee, B. Grunzweig, J. (2015, December 22). BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger. Retrieved August 19, 2016.

  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0127
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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