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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0126: ComRAT

ComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0126MalwareObject v1.4Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0126: ComRAT describes [ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126) is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of [Agent.btz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092) and used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). The first version of [ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126) was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug)(Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020)

Executive priority

S0126: ComRAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0126: ComRAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0126: ComRAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

ComRAT

ComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1071.003Mail ProtocolsSub-technique

ComRAT can use email attachments for command and control.[3]

EnterpriseT1564.005Hidden File SystemSub-technique

ComRAT has used a portable FAT16 partition image placed in %TEMP% as a hidden file system.[3]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

ComRAT has used HTTP requests for command and control.[2][3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

ComRAT has used a scheduled task to launch its PowerShell loader.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

ComRAT can use SSL/TLS encryption for its HTTP-based C2 channel. ComRAT has used public key cryptography with RSA and AES encrypted email attachments for its Gmail C2 channel.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

ComRAT can check the victim's default browser to determine which process to inject its communications module into.[3]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe. ComRAT has also injected its communications module into the victim's default browser to make C2 connections appear less suspicious as all network connections will be initiated by the browser process.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

ComRAT has encrypted its virtual file system using AES-256 in XTS mode.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

ComRAT has stored encrypted orchestrator code and payloads in the Registry.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

ComRAT has used encryption and base64 to obfuscate its orchestrator code in the Registry. ComRAT has also used encoded PowerShell scripts.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1029Scheduled Transfer

ComRAT has been programmed to sleep outside local business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).[3]

EnterpriseT1546.015Component Object Model HijackingSub-technique

ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32.[2]

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

ComRAT has the ability to use the Gmail web UI to receive commands and exfiltrate information.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1106Native API

ComRAT can load a PE file from memory or the file system and execute it with CreateProcessW.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

ComRAT has used cmd.exe to execute commands.[3]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

ComRAT has used unique per machine passwords to decrypt the orchestrator payload and a hardcoded XOR key to decrypt its communications module. ComRAT has also used a unique password to decrypt the file used for its hidden file system.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

ComRAT can check the default browser by querying HKCR\http\shell\open\command.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

ComRAT has used PowerShell to load itself every time a user logs in to the system. ComRAT can execute PowerShell scripts loaded into memory or from the file system.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

ComRAT has checked the victim system's date and time to perform tasks during business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1027.009Embedded PayloadsSub-technique

ComRAT has embedded a XOR encrypted communications module inside the orchestrator module.[3]CitationCISA ComRAT Oct 2020

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

ComRAT has used a task name associated with Windows SQM Consolidator.[3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4fa73c98f13f66d0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundle4fa73c98f13f…
19.11.4Older bundle4fa73c98f13f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Symantec Waterbug

    Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools

    Rascagneres, P. (2015, May). Tools used by the Uroburos actors. Retrieved August 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET ComRAT May 2020

    Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0126
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.