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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0090: Rover

Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. [1]

EnterpriseS0090MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0090: Rover describes [Rover](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090) is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)

Executive priority

S0090: Rover is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0090: Rover by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0090: Rover appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Rover

Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

10 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Rover automatically collects files from the local system and removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions on a regular timeframe.[1]

EnterpriseT1020Automated Exfiltration

Rover automatically searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions and sends them to the command and control server every 60 minutes. Rover also automatically sends keylogger files and screenshots to the C2 server on a regular timeframe.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Rover takes screenshots of the compromised system's desktop and saves them to C:\system\screenshot.bmp for exfiltration every 60 minutes.[1]

EnterpriseT1025Data from Removable Media

Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Rover searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Rover copies files from removable drives to C:\system.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Rover automatically searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Rover has keylogging functionality.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1020: Automated ExfiltrationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1025: Data from Removable MediaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a16c433b0c7c6109...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundlea16c433b0c7c…
19.11.1Older bundlea16c433b0c7c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Palo Alto Rover

    Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.

  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0090
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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