S0036: FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0036: FLASHFLOOD describes [FLASHFLOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036) is malware developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Executive priority
S0036: FLASHFLOOD is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0036: FLASHFLOOD by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0036: FLASHFLOOD appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system. FLASHFLOOD will scan the My Recent Documents, Desktop, Temporary Internet Files, and TEMP directories. FLASHFLOOD also collects information stored in the Windows Address Book.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system and removable media.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1025 | Data from Removable Media | FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique | FLASHFLOOD employs the same encoding scheme as SPACESHIP for data it stages. Data is compressed with zlib, and bytes are rotated four times before being XOR'ed with 0x23.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 133309f65b72… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 133309f65b72… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye APT30
FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0036Open source URL
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