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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0019: Regin

Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. [1]

EnterpriseS0019MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0019: Regin describes [Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some [Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)

Executive priority

S0019: Regin is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0019: Regin by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0019: Regin appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Regin

Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-technique

The Regin malware platform uses Extended Attributes to store encrypted executables.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.005Hidden File SystemSub-technique

Regin has used a hidden file system to store some of its components.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including HTTP and HTTPS.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Regin contains a keylogger.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique

Regin stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems have been found to be signed with fake certificates masquerading as originating from Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

Regin leveraged several compromised universities as proxies to obscure its origin.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique

The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including SMB.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

The Regin malware platform can use Windows admin shares to move laterally.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

The Regin malware platform can use ICMP to communicate between infected computers.[1]

EnterpriseT1040Network Sniffing

Regin appears to have functionality to sniff for credentials passed over HTTP, SMTP, and SMB.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
73b873454bf8c4f5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle73b873454bf8…
19.11.2Older bundle73b873454bf8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Regin

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November 24). THE REGIN PLATFORM NATION-STATE OWNAGE OF GSM NETWORKS. Retrieved December 1, 2014.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0019
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.