G0133: Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. Nomadic Octopus has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0133: Nomadic Octopus describes [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Oct...
Executive priority
G0133: Nomadic Octopus is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0133: Nomadic Octopus by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0133: Nomadic Octopus appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. Nomadic Octopus has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Nomadic Octopus used |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | Nomadic Octopus attempted to make Octopus appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Nomadic Octopus as attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Nomadic Octopus has used malicious macros to download additional files to the victim's machine.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | Nomadic Octopus executed PowerShell in a hidden window.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Nomadic Octopus has used PowerShell for execution.[3] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0340: Octopus
Octopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d8a411556fef… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 9cb9bdfc32af… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018
Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Securelist Octopus Oct 2018
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018
Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]DustSquad
(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018)
- [5]Nomadic Octopus
(Citation: SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)
- [6]SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018
Kovacs, E. (2018, October 18). Russia-Linked Hackers Target Diplomatic Entities in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackG0133Open source URL
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