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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0108: Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.[1]

EnterpriseG0108GroupObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0108: Blue Mockingbird describes [Blue Mockingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108) is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

Executive priority

G0108: Blue Mockingbird is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0108: Blue Mockingbird by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0108: Blue Mockingbird appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used PowerShell reverse TCP shells to issue interactive commands over a network connection.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.012COR_PROFILERSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used mofcomp.exe to establish WMI Event Subscription persistence mechanisms configured from a *.mof file.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Blue Mockingbird has collected hardware details for the victim's system, including CPU and memory information.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has made their XMRIG payloads persistent as a Windows Service.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Blue Mockingbird has used FRP, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe to set environment variables.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using rundll32.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

Blue Mockingbird has used JuicyPotato to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege to escalate from web application pool accounts to NT Authority\SYSTEM.[1]

EnterpriseT1496.001Compute HijackingSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used XMRIG to mine cryptocurrency on victim systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has obfuscated the wallet address in the payload binary.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs by configuring them to execute via the "wercplsupport" service.[1]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Blue Mockingbird has gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2019-18935, a vulnerability within Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.010Regsvr32Sub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using regsvr32.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Explorer to manually copy malicious files to remote hosts over SMB.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has masqueraded their XMRIG payload name by naming it wercplsupporte.dll after the legitimate wercplsupport.dll file.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

Blue Mockingbird has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S1144: FRP

FRP, which stands for Fast Reverse Proxy, is an openly available tool that is capable of exposing a server located behind a firewall or Network Address Translation (NAT) to the Internet. FRP can support multiple protocols including TCP, UDP, and HTTP(S) and has been abused by threat actors to proxy command and control communications.[1][2][3][4]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
58e2cf936fb1849b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle58e2cf936fb1…
19.11.3Older bundle3751d2a13f33…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020

    Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackG0108
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.