G0048: RTM
Security context for executives and security teams
G0048: RTM describes [RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048) is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name ([RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148)). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
Executive priority
G0048: RTM is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0048: RTM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0048: RTM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
RTM
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.CitationGroup IB RTM August 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | RTM has attempted to lure victims into opening e-mail attachments to execute malicious code.CitationGroup IB RTM August 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | RTM has used spearphishing attachments to distribute its malware.CitationGroup IB RTM August 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1219.002 | Remote Desktop SoftwareSub-technique | RTM has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.CitationGroup IB RTM August 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0148: RTM
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 4b79dff783bf… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 4b79dff783bf… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 6e23f5d998ab… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET RTM Feb 2017
Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]RTM
(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
- [3]mitre-attackG0048Open source URL
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