G0024: Putter Panda
Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0024: Putter Panda describes [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Executive priority
G0024: Putter Panda is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0024: Putter Panda by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0024: Putter Panda appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Putter Panda
Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | An executable dropped onto victims by Putter Panda aims to inject the specified DLL into a process that would normally be accessing the network, including Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe).[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Droppers used by Putter Panda use RC4 or a 16-byte XOR key consisting of the bytes 0xA0 – 0xAF to obfuscate payloads.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0067: pngdowner
pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple "download-and- execute" utility. [1]
S0066: 3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. [1]
S0065: 4H RAT
4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. [1]
S0068: httpclient
httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. [1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 592c30ffd4a9… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | ac98c556c546… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CrowdStrike Putter Panda
Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- [2]APT2
(Citation: Cylance Putter Panda)
- [3]Cylance Putter Panda
Gross, J. and Walter, J.. (2016, January 12). Puttering into the Future.... Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]MSUpdater
(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
- [5]Putter Panda
(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) (Citation: Cylance Putter Panda)
- [6]mitre-attackG0024Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
