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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0021: Molerats

Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseG0021GroupObject v2.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Molerats is an ATT&CK-tracked intrusion set described by MITRE as an Arabic-speaking, politically motivated group operating since 2012, with reported victim geography primarily in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. For defenders, the value of this object is less about a single signature and more about validating resilience against a recurring pattern: spearphishing-led access, user-assisted execution, Windows backdoors/RATs, persistence through scheduled tasks or Run keys, script execution, tool transfer, and credential theft from browsers.

Executive priority

Treat this as a practical test case for phishing resilience, endpoint visibility, and incident response readiness. Leaders should ask whether the organization can produce evidence that email security, endpoint logging, script controls, persistence monitoring, and credential protection would expose the ATT&CK behaviors associated with this group. Because the official ATT&CK group object has no detection text and no top-level platform list, prioritization should be based on local exposure: geographic relevance, politically sensitive business functions, executive or regional targeting risk, and the presence of Windows-heavy user endpoints where the related malware and techniques are most represented.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should map coverage against the relationship set rather than relying on a Molerats-specific detection. The relationships include use of PoisonIvy, DustySky, Spark, SharpStage, DropBook, and MoleNet, all listed with Windows platforms, plus techniques spanning spearphishing links and attachments, malicious link/file execution, PowerShell, Visual Basic, JavaScript, msiexec proxy execution, scheduled tasks, Registry Run keys/startup folders, process discovery, ingress tool transfer, deobfuscation/decoding, compression, code signing abuse, and browser credential access. Validate whether detections correlate email events, user execution, child processes from Office/browser/script hosts, persistence writes, scheduled task creation, unusual msiexec activity, downloaded payloads, and browser credential store access into an investigation timeline.

Likely telemetry

  • Email security logs for spearphishing attachments and links, including sender, recipient, URL, attachment, and delivery disposition metadata.
  • Endpoint process creation telemetry for PowerShell, Visual Basic/JScript script hosts, msiexec.exe, archive/decompression utilities, and suspicious child processes from Office applications or browsers.
  • Windows scheduled task creation/modification events and command-line details where available.
  • Windows Registry and startup folder monitoring for Run key or startup persistence changes.
  • File creation and download telemetry for transferred tools, compressed files, decoded payloads, PyInstaller/.NET artifacts where observable, and signed binaries with unusual context.

Detection direction

  • Build behavior-led analytics around the ATT&CK relationships rather than a single group label; the official object does not provide detection guidance.
  • Tune phishing detections to connect initial email delivery with endpoint execution from attachments or links, especially when followed by script interpreters, msiexec, downloads, or persistence creation.
  • Validate command-line and parent/child-process visibility for PowerShell, Visual Basic/JScript, msiexec.exe, and archive/decode activity; lack of command-line logging is a material blind spot.
  • Monitor scheduled task and Run key creation in user context, but account for legitimate software installers and administrative tools to reduce false positives.
  • Review code-signing trust logic: a signed binary should not be treated as benign without execution context, source path, signer reputation, and behavior.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize phishing controls and user-reporting workflows for attachments and links, since both spearphishing attachment and spearphishing link are associated techniques.
  • Harden endpoint execution paths: restrict or monitor script interpreters, PowerShell, and msiexec usage according to business need, with emphasis on high-risk users and regions.
  • Strengthen persistence prevention and monitoring for scheduled tasks, Registry Run keys, and startup folders on Windows endpoints.
  • Reduce credential exposure by managing browser password storage risk, enforcing strong identity controls, and ensuring rapid credential reset procedures during IR.
  • Ensure EDR, email, proxy/DNS, and identity logs are retained long enough to reconstruct the sequence from email delivery to execution, persistence, tool transfer, and credential access.
Additional notes and limits

The ATT&CK object identifies Molerats aliases as Molerats, Operation Molerats, and Gaza Cybergang, and cites reporting from ClearSky, FireEye, Kaspersky, and Cybereason. Relationship context is especially useful here because the group object has no official detection field and no top-level tactics or platforms. The strongest defensible defensive takeaway is to assess coverage for the related techniques and Windows malware relationships, while keeping geographic and political targeting context as a risk-prioritization input rather than proof of exposure.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK STIX fields, external references, and relationships. It does not assert current activity, customer targeting, confirmed compromise, or guaranteed detection. Top-level platforms and tactics are not specified for the intrusion-set object; platform references come only from related software and technique objects. Local environment telemetry, asset exposure, business geography, and control configuration are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Molerats

Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.[5]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.[3][5]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Molerats used executables to download malicious files from different sources.[3][5]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Molerats has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.[6]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

Molerats has delivered compressed executables within ZIP files to victims.[3]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[5]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine.[3]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.[3][5][4]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Molerats actors obtained a list of active processes on the victim and sent them to C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.[3]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

Molerats used the public tool BrowserPasswordDump10 to dump passwords saved in browsers on victims.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Molerats used PowerShell implants on target machines.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Molerats used various implants, including those built with VBScript, on target machines.[3][5]

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

Molerats used various implants, including those built with JS, on target machines.[3]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Molerats has sent malicious files via email that tricked users into clicking Enable Content to run an embedded macro and to download malicious archives.[3][5][4]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0553: MoleNet

MoleNet is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS0553: MoleNetEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.007: MsiexecEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0543: SparkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0062: DustySkyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0547: DropBookEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0546: SharpStageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.007: JavaScriptEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0012: PoisonIvyEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
096dac19e8b287c3...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.1Current bundle096dac19e8b2…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

  3. [3]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

  12. [12]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

  13. [13]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Gaza Cybergang

    (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  16. [16]
    Gaza Cybergang

    (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  17. [17]
    Gaza Cybergang

    (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  18. [18]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Molerats

    (Citation: DustySky)

  21. [21]
    Molerats

    (Citation: DustySky)

  22. [22]
    Molerats

    (Citation: DustySky)

  23. [23]
    Operation Molerats

    (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  24. [24]
    Operation Molerats

    (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  25. [25]
    Operation Molerats

    (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  26. [26]
    mitre-attackG0021
    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    mitre-attackG0021
    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    mitre-attackG0021
    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

  51. [51]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

  52. [52]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  67. [67]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  68. [68]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  69. [69]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  70. [70]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  71. [71]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  72. [72]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  73. [73]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  74. [74]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  75. [75]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  76. [76]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020

    Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
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    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

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    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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