Detections

Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) Windows host simultaneously holding connections to both the field device subnet and an unexpected external or inter-zone destination, combined with proxy-capable process spawning and ICS vendor application logs showing endpoint or certificate changes. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.

Real-time monitoring identifies a service control command targeting a critical Industrial Control System (ICS) services such as Open Platform Communications (OPC) server, historian, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) polling from an account not in the authorized service administration role, without a preceding change-control ticket, immediately followed by the service transitioning to Stopped state. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Configured Windows object-access monitoring identifies a write to an Industrial Control System (ICS) engineering project file by a process that is not the recognized vendor engineering software, or by the vendor engineering software immediately after loading a project file from an untrusted source. Documented mechanism in Havex (trojanized vendor software/installers distributed via compromised vendor websites). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance. Collection requirement: use Windows Security Event ID 4663 with Object Access auditing and SACLs on approved project repositories; Sysmon FileCreate events can corroborate writes/overwrites but do not report generic file-open/read activity.

Real-time monitoring identifies a network-accessible service process (lsass.exe, a vendor remote management service) spawning an unexpected child process or exhibiting cross-process memory access patterns immediately following inbound connection from an unusual source. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.

Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol requests specifically targeting mode/status registers from a source not in the approved control server or engineering workstation list, where the request pattern is narrowly focused on mode/state data rather than broader process value polling. Directly documented in the Triton attack chain's 'Get Control Program Status' request. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

Real-time monitoring identifies execution of network enumeration commands (netstat, arp -a, Get-NetTCPConnection) on an Industrial Control System (ICS) host from an account not associated with documented network administration, where multiple such commands execute in sequence within a short window. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol commands changing device-level credentials or access codes from a source not in the approved security administration list, where the device subsequently rejects connections from legitimate control system components. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Real-time monitoring identifies an interactive desktop session Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Virtual Network Computing (VNC), or vendor remote console to an Human-Machine Interface (HMI) or engineering station from a source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses outside the approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) subnet, or from an account not in the approved operator/engineer list, where the session subsequently interacts with Industrial Control System (ICS) control elements. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.

Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol write to output register addresses on a field device from a source not in the approved write-source list, correlated with a discrepancy between the value reported by the Input/Output (I/O) image and an independent measurement of the actual physical output state. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. The independent measurement is process-state telemetry, not network-flow evidence; implementation requires a separately trusted sensor/historian/measurement path with time alignment and an engineering-defined tolerance.

Real-time monitoring identifies a single Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol session reading the complete Input/Output (I/O) image from a field device, rather than the sparse, fixed tag subset that legitimate Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) polling queries, from a source not in the approved control server list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol write to a parameter/setpoint register where the written value falls outside the documented safe operating range, or where the write originates from a source not in the approved write-source list, correlated with subsequent historian tag drift. Documented precedent: FrostyGoop directly modified Modbus holding register values on ENCO heating controllers in Lviv, Ukraine, causing a two-day remediation outage. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Real-time monitoring identifies Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) SET commands to alarm threshold Object Identifiers (OIDs) on Industrial Control System (ICS) network devices or process monitoring systems from a source not in the approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) subnet. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

Periodic or event-triggered integrity verification identifies a discrepancy between a field device's self-reported diagnostic state and an independently verified hardware/firmware fingerprint, indicating the device's reporting layer has been compromised. MITRE explicitly notes firmware/module rootkits 'can also be developed for the Input/Output (I/O) that is attached to an asset.'. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance. Monitoring reality: this is an integrity/posture analytic, not a universal streaming field-device event; collection cadence depends on the vendor integrity interface, asset-management system, or acquisition workflow.

Real-time monitoring identifies an email client process on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux workstation spawning a child process inconsistent with normal email handling. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.

Real-time monitoring identifies a browser process on an Industrial Control System (ICS) workstation spawning an unexpected child process immediately following navigation to an external website, particularly a vendor support or software-download site. Documented Havex precedent: adversaries compromised legitimate ICS vendor websites to serve trojanized software downloads. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.

Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol write to an existing program block from a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, outside a scheduled change-control window, correlated against post-modification program hash comparison and measurable change in controller Input/Output (I/O) behavior. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Real-time monitoring identifies the absence of expected command-message delivery confirmation -- a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-issued command that does not produce the expected corresponding state-change response within the normal response latency window, while the device remains reachable for other traffic. Documented in the 2015 Ukraine attack, where Sandworm used malicious firmware to render serial-to-Ethernet converters inoperable. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

Real-time monitoring identifies remote Windows system-information queries using WMI/CIM, WinRM, PowerShell remoting, or equivalent management tooling where the command names a non-local target and the account/source is outside the approved management baseline. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol session that systematically enumerates a device's full tag/object namespace from a source not in the approved control server list, where the enumeration pattern covers the complete address/object space rather than the sparse, fixed tag set legitimate Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) polling queries. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.