AN1913: Analytic 1913
Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.[1] For added context on adversary procedures and background see Spearphishing Attachment. Monitor for newly constructed files from a spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Monitor network traffic for suspicious email attachments. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Use web proxies to review content of emails including sender information, headers, and attachments for potentially malicious content. Monitor mail server and proxy logs for evidence of messages originating from spoofed addresses, including records indicating failed DKIM+SPF validation or mismatched message headers.[2][3] Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer.
Security context for executives and security teams
AN1913: Analytic 1913 describes Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) For added context on adversary procedures and background see [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Monitor for newly constructed files from a spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Monitor network traffic for suspicious email attachments. Consider correlation with proces...
Executive priority
AN1913: Analytic 1913 is an official MITRE ATT&CK detection analytic. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate AN1913: Analytic 1913 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether AN1913: Analytic 1913 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Analytic 1913
Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.[1] For added context on adversary procedures and background see Spearphishing Attachment. Monitor for newly constructed files from a spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Monitor network traffic for suspicious email attachments. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Use web proxies to review content of emails including sender information, headers, and attachments for potentially malicious content. Monitor mail server and proxy logs for evidence of messages originating from spoofed addresses, including records indicating failed DKIM+SPF validation or mismatched message headers.[2][3] Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b7b771017659… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b7b771017659… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft Anti Spoofing
Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]ACSC Email Spoofing
Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackAN1913Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.