C0032: C0032
C0032 was an extended campaign suspected to involve the Triton adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
C0032: C0032 describes [C0032](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0032) was an extended campaign suspected to involve the [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0030).(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)
Executive priority
C0032: C0032 is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate C0032: C0032 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether C0032: C0032 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
C0032
C0032 was an extended campaign suspected to involve the Triton adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used encrypted SSH-based PLINK tunnels to transfer tools and enable RDP connections throughout the environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used compromised VPN accounts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1583.003 | Virtual Private ServerSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1021.004 | SSHSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles planted Web shells on Outlook Exchange servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 443, 4444, 8531, and 50501 during C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used PowerShell to perform timestomping.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used VPN access to persist in the victim environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used scheduled task XML triggers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the |
| Enterprise | T1546.012 | Image File Execution Options InjectionSub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles modified and added entries within |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0088: TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.[1][2][3]
S0002: Mimikatz
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | eb82bd50e691… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | fb56acd6c032… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye TRITON 2019
Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackC0032Open source URL
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