C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack
Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization.[1] The malware and techniques used within this campaign targeted specific Triconex Safety Controllers within the environment.[2] The incident was eventually discovered due to a safety trip that occurred as a result of an issue in the malware.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack describes [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0030) was a campaign employed by [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) which leveraged the [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) malware framework against a petrochemical organization.(Citation: Triton-EENews-2017) The malware and techniques used within this campaign targeted specific Triconex [Safety Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/assets/A0010)s within the environment.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2018) The i...
Executive priority
C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack
Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization.[1] The malware and techniques used within this campaign targeted specific Triconex Safety Controllers within the environment.[2] The incident was eventually discovered due to a safety trip that occurred as a result of an issue in the malware.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used tools such as Mimikatz and other open-source software.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files. |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used Mimikatz.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles developed, prior to the attack, malware capabilities that would require access to specific and specialized hardware and software.CitationFireEye TRITON Dec 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1056.003 | Web Portal CaptureSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles captured credentials as they were being changed by redirecting text-based login codes to websites they controlled.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used a publicly available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1027.005 | Indicator Removal from ToolsSub-technique | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease anti-virus detection rates.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used cryptcat binaries to encrypt their traffic.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1595 | Active Scanning | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest.CitationFireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0088: TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.[1][2][3]
S0002: Mimikatz
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 6f568f9d8e65… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | ed4747709bd6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Triton-EENews-2017
Blake Sobczak. (2019, March 7). The inside story of the world’s most dangerous malware. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]FireEye TRITON 2018
Miller, S. Reese, E. (2018, June 7). A Totally Tubular Treatise on TRITON and TriStation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]FireEye TRITON 2017
Johnson, B, et. al. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework "TRITON" and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackC0030Open source URL
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