C0031: Unitronics Defacement Campaign
The Unitronics Defacement Campaign was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the CyberAv3ngers, where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly found in are water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the PLCs' HMIs.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
C0031: Unitronics Defacement Campaign describes The [Unitronics Defacement Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0031) was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027), where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series [Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)](https://attack.mitre.org/assets/A0003) with [Human-Machine Interface (HMI)](https://attack.mitre.org/assets/A0002). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly foun...
Executive priority
C0031: Unitronics Defacement Campaign is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate C0031: Unitronics Defacement Campaign by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether C0031: Unitronics Defacement Campaign appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Unitronics Defacement Campaign
The Unitronics Defacement Campaign was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the CyberAv3ngers, where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly found in are water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the PLCs' HMIs.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0826 | Loss of Availability | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers caused multiple businesses to halt operations due to the unavailability of the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) and Human-Machine Interface (HMI). These victims covered multiple sectors.CitationJamie Tarabay and Katrina Manson December 2023 |
| ICS | T0814 | Denial of Service | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers defaced controllers’ Human-Machine Interface (HMI), which prevented multiple entities from being able to operate their devices normally.[1]CitationCISA Unitronics November 2023CitationJamie Tarabay and Katrina Manson December 2023[2] Additionally, the CyberAv3ngers caused a communications failure in a remote pumping station.CitationWPXI Aliquippa Water November 2023 |
| ICS | T0829 | Loss of View | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers replaced the existing graphic on the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Human-Machine Interface (HMI) with their own, thereby preventing PLC owners and operators from viewing PLC information on the HMI.[1]CitationJamie Tarabay and Katrina Manson December 2023 |
| ICS | T0883 | Internet Accessible Device | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers exploited devices connected to the public internet, such as internet connected Unitronics Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and networking equipment such as cellular modems found in OT environments.[1][3] |
| ICS | T1694.001 | Default CredentialsSub-technique | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers discovered and exploited default credentials found on many Unitronics Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Human-Machine Interface (HMI). For many of these devices, the default password was set to ‘1111’.[1]CitationCISA Unitronics November 2023 |
| ICS | T0828 | Loss of Productivity and Revenue | During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers caused multiple businesses to halt operations in their industrial environments, impacting their typical business operations. These victims covered multiple sectors.CitationJamie Tarabay and Katrina Manson December 2023 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1027: CyberAv3ngers
The CyberAv3ngers are a suspected Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated APT group. The CyberAv3ngers have been known to be active since at least 2020, with disputed and false claims of critical infrastructure compromises in Israel.[1]
In 2023, the CyberAv3ngers engaged in a global targeting and hacking of the Unitronics Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). This PLC can be found in multiple sectors, including water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the devices user interface.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d4e281cbe5a4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 74ac4a9862b7… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA AA23-335A IRGC-Affiliated December 2023
DHS/CISA. (2023, December 1). IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Frank Bajak and Marc Levy December 2023
Frank Bajak and Marc Levy. (2023, December 2). Breaches by Iran-affiliated hackers spanned multiple U.S. states, federal agencies say. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Lisa Zahner December 2023
Lisa Zahner. (2023, December 15). Hackers in Iran attack computer at Vero Utilities. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackC0031Open source URL
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