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MITRE ATT&CK® Tool

S1091: Pacu

Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

EnterpriseS1091ToolObject v1.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Pacu matters because it packages many AWS/IaaS post-access behaviors into an open-source framework: cloud API execution, account and group discovery, infrastructure and storage enumeration, credential and secrets access, snapshot creation, serverless or administration-command execution, and changes to logging or cloud firewall controls. For leaders, the key issue is not the tool name alone; it is whether the organization can see and govern high-risk cloud control-plane actions performed with valid cloud accounts.

Executive priority

Treat this as a cloud readiness and identity-governance validation item. ATT&CK lists Pacu as an AWS exploitation framework and relates it to techniques spanning discovery, execution, credential access, collection, persistence, privilege escalation, and defense impairment. Executives should ask whether cloud audit logging, IAM least privilege, secrets governance, storage access monitoring, and incident response playbooks can distinguish authorized administration from suspicious automated enumeration or control changes.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage around IaaS control-plane activity rather than relying on a Pacu signature. The relationship set points to Cloud API execution, Cloud Accounts, Cloud Groups, Cloud Infrastructure Discovery, Cloud Storage Object Discovery, Data from Cloud Storage, Cloud Secrets Management Stores, Create Snapshot, Serverless Execution, Cloud Administration Command, Disable or Modify Cloud Log, and Cloud Firewall modification. Detection engineering should focus on unusual API volume, breadth of enumeration, sensitive credential or storage access, new credentials, snapshots, logging changes, and security group/firewall changes by identities, sessions, or source locations that do not match expected administrative patterns.

Likely telemetry

  • Cloud control-plane audit logs for API calls and administrative actions
  • Identity and access management events for users, roles, groups, permissions, and added credentials
  • Cloud account authentication/session context, including source location and user agent where available
  • Cloud storage listing, object access, and data retrieval logs
  • Secrets manager access logs for reads or enumeration of secrets

Detection direction

  • Baseline normal cloud administration so high-volume or broad API enumeration can be separated from expected inventory, compliance, or DevOps activity.
  • Correlate discovery sequences across accounts, groups, services, infrastructure, logs, storage objects, and security tooling rather than alerting on a single benign-looking API call.
  • Prioritize detections for sensitive transitions: added cloud credentials, secrets access, snapshot creation, data access from cloud storage, serverless execution, administration-command execution, logging changes, and cloud firewall modifications.
  • Use relationship context to build cloud kill-chain style analytics: valid cloud account use followed by discovery, credential or storage access, and defense-impairment actions should raise priority.
  • Account for false positives from legitimate security assessments, cloud inventory tools, backup processes, and infrastructure automation; require change-ticket, role, source, and timing context where possible.

Mitigation priorities

  • Enforce least privilege for cloud identities, especially permissions that read secrets, enumerate broad resources, create snapshots, modify logging, change firewall rules, or execute cloud administration commands.
  • Protect and monitor cloud audit logging so it is enabled, retained, and resistant to modification by routine administrative identities.
  • Review credential hygiene for cloud accounts, service identities, and secrets management stores; remove unnecessary long-lived or additional credentials.
  • Limit access to cloud storage and secrets to explicit business need, and monitor high-risk read/list activity.
  • Require governance and approval paths for snapshot creation, serverless execution, cloud administration commands, and firewall/security group changes.
Analyst notes and limits

Pacu is identified by ATT&CK as an open-source AWS exploitation framework written in Python and publicly available on GitHub. The strongest defensive value comes from the listed ATT&CK relationships: they show the kinds of cloud behaviors defenders should validate across AWS/IaaS telemetry. This take intentionally emphasizes behavior-based monitoring and control validation, not tool-specific indicators.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide official detection guidance, aliases, labels, or explicit tactics for Pacu itself. Relationship descriptions support AWS/IaaS-oriented defensive planning, but local cloud architecture, logging configuration, identity model, and authorized administration patterns are required to determine real exposure or detection quality. No active exploitation, attribution, or customer impact is implied.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Pacu

Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1648 Serverless Execution

Pacu can create malicious Lambda functions.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log Sub-technique

Pacu can disable or otherwise restrict various AWS logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and VPC flow logs.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery

Pacu can enumerate AWS storage services, such as S3 buckets and Elastic Block Store volumes.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

Once inside a Virtual Private Cloud, Pacu can attempt to identify DirectConnect, VPN, or VPC Peering.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1654 Log Enumeration

Pacu can collect CloudTrail event histories and CloudWatch logs.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1526 Cloud Service Discovery

Pacu can enumerate AWS services, such as CloudTrail and CloudWatch.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Pacu can search for sensitive data: for example, in Code Build environment variables, EC2 user data, and Cloud Formation templates.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Pacu can set up S3 bucket notifications to trigger a malicious Lambda function when a CloudFormation template is uploaded to the bucket. It can also create Lambda functions that trigger upon the creation of users, roles, and groups.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1686.001 Cloud Firewall Sub-technique

Pacu can allowlist IP addresses in AWS GuardDuty.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1069.003 Cloud Groups Sub-technique

Pacu can enumerate IAM permissions.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials Sub-technique

Pacu can generate SSH and API keys for AWS infrastructure and additional API keys for other IAM users.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores Sub-technique

Pacu can retrieve secrets from the AWS Secrets Manager via the enum_secrets module.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

Pacu can enumerate AWS infrastructure, such as EC2 instances.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1059.009 Cloud API Sub-technique

Pacu leverages the AWS CLI for its operations.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Pacu can enumerate and download files stored in AWS storage services, such as S3 buckets.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Sub-technique

Pacu leverages valid cloud accounts to perform most of its operations.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Pacu can automatically collect data, such as CloudFormation templates, EC2 user data, AWS Inspector reports, and IAM credential reports.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Sub-technique

Pacu can enumerate AWS security services, including WAF rules and GuardDuty detectors.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1578.001 Create Snapshot Sub-technique

Pacu can create snapshots of EBS volumes and RDS instances.CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1087.004 Cloud Account Sub-technique

Pacu can enumerate IAM users, roles, and groups. CitationGitHub Pacu

Enterprise T1651 Cloud Administration Command

Pacu can run commands on EC2 instances using AWS Systems Manager Run Command.CitationGitHub Pacu

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b572038b0281c351...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle b572038b0281…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    GitHub Pacu

    Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack S1091
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.