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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1059.008: Network Device CLI

Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.

Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.

Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.008Sub-techniqueObject v1.2 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Network Device CLI abuse matters because routers, switches, and security appliances often sit in the path of critical business traffic. If an adversary can execute commands through a device CLI or supported scripting interpreter, they may change device behavior, alter traffic flows, modify startup configuration, or disable logging and security features. For leaders, this is not just an endpoint execution issue; it is a resilience, visibility, and change-control issue for the infrastructure that carries the business.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where network devices support remote administration or scripting and where outages, traffic manipulation, or loss of logging would materially affect operations. Executives should ask whether privileged access to network devices is governed with the same rigor as servers and cloud consoles, whether command history and configuration evidence are retained for incident response and audit, and whether the SOC can distinguish approved network administration from suspicious CLI activity. ATT&CK relationship context also shows relevance to network-device malware and campaigns, including infrastructure-impacting scenarios, so coverage should be considered in business continuity and cyber-physical risk planning where network devices support operational environments.

Technical view

For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate visibility around execution through network device CLIs on the Network Devices platform under the Execution tactic. Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, but the object references CLI access through direct console, telnet, and SSH, and the relationship context includes DET0142, Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices. Practical validation should focus on command history, administrative authentication, privilege level changes, configuration changes, startup configuration modifications, traffic-flow changes, and events indicating logging or security features were disabled. Treat this as a command-and-scripting-interpreter problem specialized to network operating systems and appliances, not only as traditional host shell monitoring.

Likely telemetry

  • Network device command history where available
  • AAA, authentication, authorization, and accounting records for network device administration
  • SSH, telnet, and direct console access logs
  • Privilege level changes and administrative role usage
  • Running and startup configuration change records

Detection direction

  • Map DET0142-style behavioral detection to local network device families and management workflows rather than relying on a generic endpoint command-line model.
  • Baseline normal administrative commands, maintenance windows, source locations, and privileged users so unusual CLI activity can be investigated without overwhelming analysts with routine operations.
  • Correlate CLI commands with authentication events, privilege escalation, configuration diffs, and change-management records.
  • Pay special attention to commands or sequences that modify startup configuration, manipulate traffic flows, disable logging, or change security features, because these behaviors are explicitly described by ATT&CK for this technique.
  • Validate whether command history is actually retained and centrally collected; many environments assume network-device visibility exists when it is incomplete, local-only, or overwritten.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with User Account Management: ensure network device accounts have defined owners, lifecycle controls, timely deactivation, and appropriate access scope.
  • Strengthen Privileged Account Management: restrict administrative roles, enforce least privilege, and ensure privileged actions are attributable and logged.
  • Limit management access paths to approved methods and administrators; the ATT&CK object specifically notes console, telnet, and SSH as CLI access routes.
  • Where supported by the device or network OS, apply Execution Prevention concepts to restrict unauthorized scripts, interpreters, or code execution paths.
  • Pair technical controls with configuration backup, command logging, and change review so responders can determine what changed and restore trusted device behavior.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK T1059.008 Network Device CLI, its official description, external references, and supplied relationships. Relationship context includes mitigation mappings to User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and Execution Prevention; a detection strategy named Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices; parent technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; and campaign/software relationships involving network-device activity. These relationships support prioritizing identity governance, privileged access, command telemetry, and configuration integrity for network infrastructure.

Official ATT&CK detection guidance for this sub-technique is not provided in the supplied object. Specific commands, device vendors, log fields, and detection logic must be validated against the organization’s actual network devices, operating systems, management protocols, and logging architecture. The supplied relationships indicate that campaigns and software use this technique, but they do not by themselves establish local exposure, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Network Device CLI

Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.

Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.

Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter This object subtechnique of Command and Scripting Interpreter.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Enterprise

S9013: DRYHOOK

DRYHOOK is Python script used to steal credentials. DRYHOOK was first reported in January 2025, and has previously been leveraged by People's Republic of China (PRC) state-affiliated threat actors identified as UNC5221 and SYLVANITE.[1][2][3]

LinuxNetwork Devices
Malware Enterprise

S9014: PHASEJAM

PHASEJAM is a dropper written as a bash shell script that modifies Ivanti Connect Secure appliance components. PHASEJAM was first reported in January 2025. PHASEJAM has previously been leveraged by People's Republic of China (PRC)- affiliated actors identified as UNC5221 and SYLVANITE.[1][2]

LinuxNetwork Devices
Campaign Enterprise

C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]

Campaign Enterprise

C0056: RedPenguin

The RedPenguin project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. RedPenguin activity was separately attributed to UNC3886 and included the deployment of multiple custom versions of the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor on Juniper routers.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Campaign C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks Enterprise uses · Campaign C0056: RedPenguin Enterprise uses · Malware S9013: DRYHOOK Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1038: Execution Prevention Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0142: Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices Enterprise uses · Malware S1186: Line Dancer Enterprise uses · Malware S9014: PHASEJAM Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1026: Privileged Account Management Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1018: User Account Management Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1038: Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Control:

- Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`)

Script Blocking:

- Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`)

Executable Blocking:

- Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories.

Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
be5f65d971e01461...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.2 Current bundle be5f65d971e0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cisco Synful Knock Evolution

    Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attack T1059.008
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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