Live Active security incident? Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP.[1] On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.[2]

Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.

EnterpriseT1048TechniqueObject v1.6 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol matters because data theft may not follow the same path as an attacker’s command-and-control activity. An organization can contain or monitor one channel while sensitive files, email, source code, or cloud-hosted data leave through another allowed protocol such as HTTP/S, FTP, SMTP, DNS, SMB, web consoles, or cloud APIs. For leaders, this is a test of whether egress control, cloud access governance, DLP, and SOC visibility cover the normal business channels attackers can blend into.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where sensitive business data is reachable from endpoints, servers, SaaS, IaaS, Office Suite platforms, network devices, or ESXi/Linux/macOS/Windows systems. The decision question is not only “do we monitor malware C2,” but “can we prove unusual outbound transfer, direct cloud download, or protocol misuse would be noticed and constrained?” This supports business continuity, breach response readiness, audit evidence for data protection controls, and control prioritization around user account management, file permissions, network segmentation, traffic filtering, intrusion prevention, and DLP.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as an enterprise exfiltration technique across ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, and Windows. The core behavior is data leaving over a protocol or destination different from the primary C2 channel, including FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, web consoles, and cloud APIs. Detection engineering should validate coverage by protocol family and by data location: endpoint utilities such as Net/SMB, FTP tools, curl on macOS/Linux, SaaS/IaaS download activity, and cloud API access to sensitive repositories or storage. Relationship context is important: ATT&CK includes encrypted and unencrypted sub-techniques under T1048, so visibility cannot rely only on payload inspection; metadata, identity context, destination reputation, transfer volume, and access patterns are often decisive.

Likely telemetry

  • Network egress flow records, proxy logs, firewall logs, DNS logs, SMTP/FTP/HTTP/S/SMB protocol telemetry where available
  • Endpoint process execution and command-line telemetry for common transfer utilities such as curl, FTP clients, and Net/SMB-related usage
  • Cloud API audit logs and SaaS/web console activity for file, email, source code, and object storage downloads
  • Identity and account activity tied to users, service accounts, privileged accounts, and anomalous access to sensitive data
  • DLP events or data classification alerts for sensitive file movement

Detection direction

  • Map DET0131, Behavioral Detection Strategy for Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, to local data sources and confirm which protocols, platforms, and cloud services are actually covered.
  • Baseline normal outbound transfer patterns by user, host, service account, protocol, destination, and data repository; tune for unusual volume, new destinations, rare protocols, or transfers following sensitive file access.
  • Do not depend only on known C2 indicators. This technique specifically uses an alternate protocol or location, and sub-techniques include encrypted and unencrypted non-C2 protocols.
  • Correlate endpoint process activity with network egress: for example, a transfer utility or SMB/FTP-related process followed by outbound traffic to an unusual destination is stronger than either signal alone.
  • For SaaS and IaaS, validate audit coverage for direct downloads through web consoles and Cloud API activity, including Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3 where present in the environment.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with data access reduction: apply User Account Management and least privilege so only required users, service accounts, and processes can access sensitive data.
  • Restrict file and directory permissions on sensitive repositories and systems so exfiltration requires overcoming fewer unnecessary access paths.
  • Use network segmentation to limit which systems can reach external destinations or sensitive internal data stores.
  • Filter network traffic at ingress, egress, and lateral paths; restrict protocols and destinations that are not required for business use.
  • Use network intrusion prevention or detection signatures at network boundaries where appropriate, while recognizing encrypted or obfuscated channels may limit content inspection.
Analyst notes and limits

ATT&CK does not provide a dedicated official detection paragraph for this object, so the defensive guidance relies on the official description, platforms, sub-technique relationships, DET0131 relationship, and listed mitigations. The relationships show relevance across cloud/container-focused activity, ransomware-related activity, Windows/macOS/Linux malware, POS malware, and Azure AD administration tooling, but those relationships should be used for detection context rather than assumptions about local exposure.

This take does not assert active exploitation, actor targeting of any specific organization, or guaranteed detection coverage. Local architecture determines materiality: cloud services in use, sensitive data locations, allowed egress protocols, logging retention, identity model, and DLP maturity must be validated in the customer environment.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP.[1] On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.[2]

Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

3 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G1040: Play

Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

Malware Enterprise

S0482: Bundlore

Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.[1]

macOS
Malware Enterprise

S0428: PoetRAT

PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0631: Chaes

Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0641: Kobalos

Kobalos is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. Kobalos has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. Kobalos was first identified in late 2019.[1][2]

Linux
Tool Enterprise

S0677: AADInternals

AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.[1][2]

WindowsOffice SuiteIdentity Provider
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.6
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3b683d1283ffe16b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.6 Current bundle 3b683d1283ff…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016

    Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques

    Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    University of Birmingham C2

    Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attack T1048
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.