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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9029: IronWind

IronWind is a custom loader malware that has been in use since at least 2023 by actors including WIRTE to target entities in the Middle East.[1]

EnterpriseS9029MalwareObject v1.0 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

IronWind matters because ATT&CK identifies it as a custom Windows loader associated with Middle East targeting and use by WIRTE. For leaders, the decision point is not the malware name alone; it is whether Windows endpoint, command-line, DLL, discovery, cleanup, and web-traffic monitoring are mature enough to expose a loader preparing the environment for follow-on activity.

Executive priority

Treat IronWind as a validation case for Windows intrusion readiness in organizations with Middle East exposure or similar diplomatic, financial, military, legal, or technology risk profiles referenced in the related WIRTE context. Priority should go to proving that SOC and IR teams can reconstruct early loader activity, distinguish suspicious discovery from administration, and preserve evidence even when indicator-removal behavior is attempted. This supports incident decision-making, audit evidence for monitoring controls, and budget prioritization for endpoint and network telemetry gaps.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for IronWind, so defenders should build coverage from the relationship context: Windows Command Shell execution, command obfuscation, deobfuscation or decoding, user/system/software discovery, DLL abuse, web-protocol command-and-control, and indicator removal. On Windows, validate visibility into process creation with command lines, parent-child process chains, DLL load behavior, file writes or decoded artifacts, discovery commands, and outbound HTTP/S-like traffic. Detection engineering should focus on behavior combinations rather than a single signature: obfuscated command execution followed by local discovery, decoding, unusual DLL activity, and external web-protocol communication is more material than any one event alone.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line logging
  • Parent-child process relationships involving command shell execution
  • DLL/module load and suspicious library path activity
  • File creation, modification, deletion, and possible decoded or deobfuscated artifacts
  • User, system, and installed software discovery evidence

Detection direction

  • Because ATT&CK provides no IronWind-specific detection guidance, validate behavior-based analytics mapped to the related techniques rather than relying on malware naming alone.
  • Tune command-line detections for obfuscation and decoding while accounting for legitimate administrative scripts and software deployment tools.
  • Correlate discovery commands with unusual execution context, new binaries, suspicious parent processes, or unexpected outbound web traffic.
  • Review DLL-related detections for side-loading, unexpected load paths, and abnormal signed/unsigned library combinations on Windows systems.
  • Use network controls to identify unusual web-protocol communications, but expect false positives because HTTP/S traffic is common and often business-critical.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize Windows endpoint visibility: process command lines, module loads, file activity, and durable log forwarding.
  • Harden execution paths with application control, least privilege, and restrictions on unnecessary command shell use where operationally feasible.
  • Reduce DLL abuse risk by reviewing application directories, search-order exposure, and unauthorized write permissions in executable paths.
  • Improve egress governance with proxy logging, DNS visibility, and policy-based control of outbound web traffic.
  • Prepare IR playbooks for loader activity that include rapid host isolation, evidence preservation, and review of discovery and cleanup behavior.
Analyst notes and limits

The object is a malware entry for IronWind, described by ATT&CK as a custom loader in use since at least 2023 by actors including WIRTE. Relationship context links it to multiple techniques spanning execution, stealth, discovery, command-and-control, and DLL abuse. The most useful defensive value is to test whether those behaviors are observable together on Windows endpoints and whether SOC workflows can escalate them before follow-on activity is missed.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection field, no listed tactics, no aliases, and limited platform scope beyond Windows. The related technique descriptions provide behavioral context but not IronWind-specific procedures or indicators. Local asset criticality, regional exposure, telemetry coverage, and baseline administrative activity are required to determine priority and tune detections.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

IronWind

IronWind is a custom loader malware that has been in use since at least 2023 by actors including WIRTE to target entities in the Middle East.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

IronWind can capture the OS version and computer name of the compromised host.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

IronWind can used HTTP to send information to C2 about the targeted system.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

IronWind can enumerate the username on victim's systems.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

IronWind has used DLL sideloading for execution.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1027.010 Command Obfuscation Sub-technique

IronWind has used Base64 encoding and XOR encryption with the key “53” to obfuscate command strings.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

IronWind can deobfuscate the next stage payload using Base64 and XOR operations with the key "53".CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

IronWind has used the Windows command shell to execute malicious files.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1518 Software Discovery

IronWind can list installed software on targeted hosts.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Enterprise T1070 Indicator Removal

IronWind has used a .NET DLL named "exit-DN4-core.dll" to terminate malicious processes running on victim's systems.CitationCheck Point Wirte NOV 2024
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0090: WIRTE

WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1082: System Information Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1071.001: Web Protocols Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1574.001: DLL Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.010: Command Obfuscation Enterprise uses · Group G0090: WIRTE Enterprise uses · Technique T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1518: Software Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1070: Indicator Removal Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d4b45240aa0e1147...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle d4b45240aa0e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Check Point Wirte NOV 2024

    Check Point. (2024, November 12). Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack S9029
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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