S1031: PingPull
PingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.[1]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
PingPull matters because ATT&CK records it as a Windows remote access Trojan associated with GALLIUM and targeting sectors where downtime, data exposure, and trust obligations are high: telecommunications, finance, and government. For leaders, the decision value is not just the malware name; it is whether the organization can prove it would notice a Windows host establishing suspicious command-and-control, creating or masquerading as a service, discovering local/network information, collecting local data, and exfiltrating over the same channel.
Executive priority
Prioritize validation where PingPull-like behavior could affect business continuity and incident decision-making: Windows endpoint visibility, service creation/change monitoring, command shell activity, outbound network control, and evidence retention for investigations. Organizations in telecom, financial, government, or similarly regulated environments should be able to show audit-ready evidence that remote access malware behaviors are monitored and that response teams can quickly scope local data access and possible exfiltration.
Technical view
MITRE provides no official detection text for PingPull, so defenders should validate coverage through the ATT&CK relationships: Windows Command Shell execution, Windows Service persistence, masqueraded tasks/services, discovery of system, network, files, and directories, local data collection, C2 over web protocols or non-application-layer protocols, non-standard ports, encoded/encrypted C2, timestomping, deobfuscation/decoding, and exfiltration over the C2 channel. Because the malware object platform is Windows, prioritize Windows endpoint and network telemetry while using the related techniques to structure detection engineering and IR playbooks.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process creation telemetry, especially cmd.exe and child processes tied to discovery or file access
- Windows service creation, modification, service binary path, display name, and registry-backed service configuration changes
- Task or service naming metadata that can reveal masquerading against legitimate-looking names
- File system metadata, including creation/modification/access timestamp anomalies relevant to timestomping
- File and directory enumeration activity and access to sensitive local files
Detection direction
- Do not rely on a PingPull signature alone; validate behavioral detections mapped to the related techniques because ATT&CK does not supply official detection guidance for this object.
- Tune Windows service monitoring for new or modified services, suspicious binary paths, and service names/descriptions that closely resemble legitimate services.
- Correlate command shell execution with discovery behavior, file enumeration, local data access, and subsequent outbound network connections from the same host or account context.
- Review egress analytics for web-protocol C2, non-standard ports, non-application-layer protocols, and encoded or encrypted payload patterns; account for legitimate admin tools and business applications to reduce false positives.
- Include timestamp manipulation checks in forensic triage, especially when new binaries or configuration files appear to blend into existing directories.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure managed endpoint detection and response coverage exists on Windows systems likely to hold sensitive operational, financial, telecom, or government data.
- Harden and monitor Windows service creation/modification paths, including administrative permissions and change-control expectations.
- Restrict unnecessary outbound connectivity and inspect/log egress through controlled proxies, firewalls, and DNS infrastructure where feasible.
- Apply least privilege for users and service accounts to reduce the value of command shell execution, local discovery, and local data collection.
- Maintain incident response procedures for rapid host isolation, service persistence review, C2 scoping, data access analysis, and exfiltration assessment.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object identifies PingPull as a Visual C++ Windows RAT and links it to GALLIUM use. The strongest defensive value comes from the relationship set: persistence via Windows services, command execution, discovery, local collection, C2, encoding/encryption, timestomping, and exfiltration over C2. Treat these as validation requirements for SOC, IR, and control assurance programs.
MITRE does not provide official detection text, aliases, labels, or object-level tactics for PingPull in the supplied fields. The object platform is Windows, even though several related techniques list broader platforms; local conclusions should therefore be based on actual Windows endpoint and network evidence. Sector and geography references come from the official description and should not be interpreted as current targeting or customer exposure.
PingPull
PingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | PingPull can use HTTPS over port 8080 for C2.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | PingPull can enumerate storage volumes and folder contents of a compromised host.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | PingPull can collect data from a compromised host.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols Sub-technique | A PingPull variant can communicate with its C2 servers by using HTTPS.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | PingPull can retrieve the hostname of a compromised host.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service Sub-technique | PingPull can mimic the names and descriptions of legitimate services such as `iphlpsvc`, `IP Helper`, and `Onedrive` to evade detection.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | PingPull can retrieve the IP address of a compromised host.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard Encoding Sub-technique | PingPull can encode C2 traffic with Base64.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows Service Sub-technique | PingPull has the ability to install itself as a service.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | Timestomp Sub-technique | PingPull has the ability to timestomp a file.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | PingPull variants have the ability to communicate with C2 servers using ICMP or TCP.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell Sub-technique | PingPull can use `cmd.exe` to run various commands as a reverse shell.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | PingPull can decrypt received data from its C2 server by using AES.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique | PingPull can use AES, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode padded with PKCS5, to encrypt C2 server communications.CitationUnit 42 PingPull Jun 2022 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0093: GALLIUM
GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.[1] Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 977b7cc7edbc… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022
Unit 42. (2022, June 13). GALLIUM Expands Targeting Across Telecommunications, Government and Finance Sectors With New PingPull Tool. Retrieved August 7, 2022.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack S1031Open source URL
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