S0411: Rotexy

Rotexy matters because it represents mobile malware behavior that can affect both fraud risk and device availability on Android. The ATT&CK record describes it as Android banking malware that evolved from SMS spyware into a tool with additional features, including ransomware functionality. For leaders, the key issue is not only malware removal; it is whether the organization can see risky mobile permissions, suspicious SMS activity, credential/PII prompting, command-and-control over web or out-of-band channels, and device lockout events before they become an incident-response or business-continuity problem.

Executive priority

Prioritize Rotexy as a mobile security readiness and incident-response planning use case for Android environments. It connects to banking/credential theft risk, contact and SMS data exposure, hidden application behavior, encrypted or obfuscated communications, and device lockout. Executives should ask whether corporate or BYOD Android devices are governed by mobile device management, whether SMS and sensitive-permission abuse can be investigated, and whether mobile incidents are included in fraud, privacy, and ransomware response playbooks.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists Rotexy on Android and relates it to obfuscation, GUI input capture, software/process/system/network discovery, web-protocol communications, symmetric cryptography, SMS control, icon suppression, device lockout, system checks, contact and SMS collection, domain generation algorithms, and out-of-band data. SOC and IR teams should validate whether mobile telemetry can expose suspicious app permissions and behavior such as SEND_SMS/RECEIVE_SMS use, SMS content access, Contacts access, hidden launcher icons, device administrator abuse or lockout behavior, unusual HTTP/HTTPS destinations, generated-domain patterns, and evidence of encrypted C2 payloads. Because no official ATT&CK detection text is provided, detections should be built from the related techniques and local Android management/logging capabilities.

Likely telemetry

Mobile device management or enterprise mobility management inventory for installed Android applications, permissions, device administrator status, and app visibility
Android application permission grants involving SMS, contacts, overlays or GUI prompts, and device administration where available
Mobile threat defense or endpoint telemetry for hidden apps, obfuscated packages, suspicious process/application discovery, and anti-analysis checks
SMS-related evidence such as unauthorized send/receive behavior, default SMS handler changes, or SMS content provider access where collection is lawful and available
Network telemetry for Android device HTTP/HTTPS traffic, unusual domains, repeated generated-looking domain lookups, and encrypted application-layer payload patterns

Detection direction

Map coverage to the ATT&CK relationships rather than to a single Rotexy signature, since the official object provides no detection guidance.
Tune for combinations of risky behaviors: SMS permissions plus contact/SMS collection, hidden launcher icon plus device admin privileges, or GUI input prompts plus banking-related app discovery.
Validate mobile network monitoring limitations, especially for HTTPS, symmetric encryption, cellular traffic, and out-of-band channels such as SMS that may bypass enterprise network sensors.
Review false positives from legitimate messaging, banking, device management, and security apps that may request powerful permissions or use web protocols.
Test whether sandboxing or analysis workflows account for system-check and obfuscation behavior that may reduce visibility in automated analysis environments.

Mitigation priorities

Establish mobile application governance for Android, including approved app sources, application inventory, and review of high-risk permissions.
Use mobile device management controls where appropriate to restrict or alert on device administrator abuse, risky SMS permissions, and unmanaged applications on corporate devices.
Include mobile malware, device lockout, SMS abuse, and credential-prompt scenarios in incident response and fraud/privacy escalation playbooks.
Harden monitoring for mobile web traffic and DNS where enterprise architecture allows, while recognizing cellular and encrypted traffic blind spots.
Educate users to report unexpected mobile credential prompts, hidden or unremovable apps, SMS anomalies, and sudden device lockout, but do not rely on user reporting as the only control.

Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the official ATT&CK Rotexy software object and its listed technique relationships. The strongest defensive value is using Rotexy as a behavioral coverage checklist for Android mobile malware that blends credential theft, discovery, SMS abuse, C2 resilience, concealment, and lockout behaviors.

MITRE provides no official detection text, no tactics in the supplied object, and no claim of current activity or targeting. Local conclusions require environment-specific evidence such as Android fleet ownership model, MDM/MTD deployment, logging permissions, privacy constraints, and network visibility across Wi-Fi and cellular paths.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Rotexy

Rotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1636.003	Contact List Sub-technique	Rotexy can access and upload the contacts list to the command and control server.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1644	Out of Band Data	Rotexy can be controlled through SMS messages.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1633.001	System Checks Sub-technique	Rotexy checks if it is running in an analysis environment.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1637.001	Domain Generation Algorithms Sub-technique	Rotexy procedurally generates subdomains for command and control communication.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1437.001	Web Protocols Sub-technique	Rotexy can communicate with the command and control server using JSON payloads sent in HTTP POST request bodies. It can also communicate by using JSON messages sent through Google Cloud Messaging.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1418	Software Discovery	Rotexy retrieves a list of installed applications and sends it to the command and control server.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1628.001	Suppress Application Icon Sub-technique	Rotexy hides its icon after first launch.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1424	Process Discovery	Rotexy collects information about running processes.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1417.002	GUI Input Capture Sub-technique	Rotexy can use phishing overlays to capture users' credit card information.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1406	Obfuscated Files or Information	Starting in 2017, the Rotexy DEX file was packed with garbage strings and/or operations.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1636.004	SMS Messages Sub-technique	Rotexy processes incoming SMS messages by filtering based on phone numbers, keywords, and regular expressions, focusing primarily on banks, payment systems, and mobile network operators. Rotexy can also send a list of all SMS messages on the device to the command and control server.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1422	System Network Configuration Discovery	Rotexy collects the device's IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1582	SMS Control	Rotexy can automatically reply to SMS messages, and optionally delete them.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1629.002	Device Lockout Sub-technique	Rotexy can lock an HTML page in the foreground, requiring the user enter credit card information that matches information previously intercepted in SMS messages, such as the last 4 digits of a credit card number. If attempts to revoke administrator permissions are detected, Rotexy periodically switches off the phone screen to inhibit permission removal.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1426	System Information Discovery	Rotexy collects information about the compromised device, including phone number, network operator, OS version, device model, and the device registration country.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018
Mobile	T1521.001	Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique	Rotexy encrypts JSON HTTP payloads with AES.Citationsecurelist rotexy 2018

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.1
Created: Sep 23, 2019, 13:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: d1f8bf76b9c29731...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	May 18, 2026, 07:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`d1f8bf76b9c2…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

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Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
securelist rotexy 2018

T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attack S0411
Open source URL

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