S0264: OopsIE
Analyst context for executives and security teams
OopsIE is a Windows Trojan associated in ATT&CK with OilRig and described as enabling remote command execution plus file upload and download. Its business significance is not the malware name itself, but the operating pattern it represents: hands-on command execution, staging, compression or custom archiving, and exfiltration over command-and-control traffic. For leaders, this is a readiness test for whether Windows endpoint, command-line, WMI, scheduled task, and web-protocol telemetry can support fast containment and evidence-based incident decisions.
Executive priority
Treat OopsIE as a useful benchmark for resilience against targeted intrusion tradecraft tied to remote execution and data movement. Priority questions are: can the organization prove visibility into suspicious Windows command execution, WMI use, scheduled tasks, file staging, archiving, deletion, and outbound web-based C2-like traffic; can incident responders reconstruct upload/download activity; and are controls tuned to detect data exfiltration that may occur in chunks or over an existing C2 channel? This is especially relevant for sectors similar to those described in the related OilRig context, including government, financial, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, but local exposure must be determined from the organization’s own environment.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no official detection text for OopsIE, so defenders should build coverage from the related behaviors. On Windows, validate telemetry and detections for Windows Command Shell, Visual Basic execution, WMI abuse, scheduled task creation or execution, system and time discovery, local data staging, archive creation via utilities or custom methods, file deletion, tool transfer, standard encoding, packed or obfuscated files, deobfuscation activity, and web-protocol command-and-control with possible exfiltration over the same channel. Detection engineering should correlate host process activity with network sessions and file activity rather than relying only on malware signatures, because the relationship set includes obfuscation, packing, encoding, and anti-analysis system checks.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint process creation and command-line arguments
- WMI activity and remote/local management events
- Scheduled task creation, modification, and execution events
- File creation, modification, staging, archive creation, and deletion events
- Endpoint malware/EDR observations for packed, obfuscated, or decoded content
Detection direction
- Because ATT&CK lists no official OopsIE detection guidance, validate behavior-based analytics mapped to the related techniques rather than a single indicator set.
- Correlate command shell, VB, WMI, and scheduled task activity with unusual parent processes, new files, outbound web connections, and follow-on staging or archiving.
- Tune for legitimate administration noise: WMI, scheduled tasks, command shell, compression utilities, and web traffic are common, so detections should consider user, host role, timing, process lineage, and destination reputation or novelty.
- Look for exfiltration patterns that may not exceed simple volume thresholds, including fixed-size chunks or data sent over the same channel used for command and control.
- Account for blind spots from obfuscation, software packing, standard encoding, file deletion, and system checks that may reduce static analysis or sandbox reliability.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize Windows endpoint visibility for process, command-line, WMI, scheduled task, file, and network activity before relying on narrow malware signatures.
- Harden and monitor administrative execution paths such as WMI, command shell usage, scripting/VB execution, and scheduled task creation according to business need.
- Apply least privilege and execution control practices to reduce unauthorized command execution, tool transfer, staging, and persistence opportunities.
- Control and monitor outbound web traffic so unusual destinations, encoded payloads, upload/download patterns, and C2-like sessions can be investigated.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include collection of volatile process context, staged files or archives, deleted-file evidence where available, and proxy/network logs needed to confirm exfiltration scope.
Analyst notes and limits
The strongest defensive value comes from treating OopsIE as a cluster of observable behaviors: remote command execution, file transfer, staging, archiving, exfiltration over C2, and stealth through obfuscation, packing, encoding, deletion, and anti-analysis checks. The ATT&CK relationship to OilRig provides threat-intelligence context, but response prioritization should be based on local asset criticality, telemetry availability, and whether similar behaviors appear in the environment.
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, no aliases, and no malware-level tactics specified. The platform explicitly supplied for OopsIE is Windows. Technique relationships provide behavior context, but they do not by themselves prove current activity, exposure, or detection coverage in any specific environment.
OopsIE
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging Sub-technique | OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits | OopsIE exfiltrates command output and collected files to its C2 server in 1500-byte blocks.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | OopsIE concatenates then decompresses multiple resources to load an embedded .Net Framework assembly.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion Sub-technique | OopsIE has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | OopsIE uses WMI to perform discovery techniques.CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard Encoding Sub-technique | OopsIE encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System Checks Sub-technique | OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols Sub-technique | OopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell Sub-technique | OopsIE uses the command prompt to execute commands on the victim's machine.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method Sub-technique | OopsIE compresses collected files with a simple character replacement scheme before sending them to its C2 server.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | OopsIE can download files from its C2 server to the victim's machine.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual Basic Sub-technique | OopsIE creates and uses a VBScript as part of its persistent execution.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via Utility Sub-technique | OopsIE compresses collected files with GZipStream before sending them to its C2 server.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task Sub-technique | OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software Packing Sub-technique | OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with "Daylight" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.CitationUnit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.CitationUnit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 75a1635b9bf3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018
Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
Open source URL -
[2]
OopsIE
(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)
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[3]
Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.
Open source URL -
[4]
mitre-attack S0264Open source URL
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