S0241: RATANKBA

RATANKBA matters because it represents a Windows remote controller capability associated in ATT&CK with Lazarus Group and reported use against financial institutions and multiple enterprise sectors. For leaders, the key risk is not just “malware present,” but an operator-controlled foothold that can run jobs, discover users, services, systems, network connections, and configuration details, and potentially transfer additional tools.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and incident-readiness use case for Windows estates, especially where financial services, telecommunications, aviation, education, insurance, IT, or consulting operations are material. Executives should ask whether the SOC can prove visibility into Windows discovery, command execution, WMI, PowerShell, web-based command-and-control, and file transfer behaviors—not just whether malware signatures exist. This object is also useful for audit and risk discussions because it maps to concrete control evidence: endpoint logging, egress monitoring, administrative tool governance, and response procedures for suspected remote access malware.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a detection section for RATANKBA, so defensive validation should be driven by the related techniques. On Windows, teams should test whether they can observe and correlate service discovery, registry queries, network and remote system discovery, user and account discovery, process discovery, WMI execution, PowerShell and cmd execution, DLL injection indicators, web-protocol command-and-control, and ingress tool transfer. The most useful analytic view is likely behavioral: unusual discovery followed by command execution, outbound web traffic, or new file/tool creation from a non-administrative or unexpected host context.

Likely telemetry

Windows process creation and command-line telemetry for cmd.exe, PowerShell, discovery utilities, and administrative commands
PowerShell logging where enabled, including script block/module activity relevant to execution and discovery
WMI activity logs and endpoint telemetry showing local or remote WMI execution
Windows Registry access/query telemetry where available
Service, process, local account, logged-on user, network configuration, and network connection discovery evidence

Detection direction

Do not rely on a RATANKBA-specific signature alone; ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this software object.
Build and tune detections around clusters of related behaviors: discovery commands, registry queries, WMI, PowerShell/cmd execution, outbound HTTP/S-like traffic, and new tool/file introduction.
Baseline legitimate administrative use of WMI, PowerShell, service queries, registry queries, and network discovery to reduce false positives from IT operations.
Pay attention to sequencing: discovery across users, processes, services, network configuration, and remote systems can be more meaningful when followed by command execution or external communications.
Validate visibility on Windows endpoints specifically, since Windows is the platform supplied for RATANKBA.

Mitigation priorities

Confirm endpoint detection and logging coverage for Windows command execution, PowerShell, WMI, registry access, process activity, and file creation.
Restrict and monitor administrative tooling such as WMI, PowerShell, and command shell usage according to least privilege and operational need.
Apply egress controls and proxy/DNS/firewall monitoring so web-protocol command-and-control and tool transfer are reviewable and enforceable.
Use application control or execution governance where practical to reduce unauthorized tool execution and DLL abuse opportunities.
Segment sensitive systems and financial or operationally critical environments to limit the value of discovery and reduce lateral movement options after compromise.

Analyst notes and limits

The strongest source-supported points are that RATANKBA is a Windows remote controller tool, is associated by ATT&CK with Lazarus Group, has been reported in activity affecting financial institutions and other enterprise sectors, and is related to multiple discovery, execution, command-and-control, ingress transfer, and DLL injection techniques. Glexia’s defensive emphasis is therefore on proving behavioral coverage across those related techniques rather than treating this as a single malware-name detection problem.

ATT&CK does not supply official detection guidance, aliases, labels, or explicit tactics for the RATANKBA object itself. The telemetry and control guidance above is inferred from the supplied relationships to ATT&CK techniques and must be validated against the local Windows environment, logging configuration, administrative practices, and network architecture. No claim is made that RATANKBA is currently active in any specific environment.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RATANKBA

RATANKBA is a remote controller tool used by Lazarus Group. RATANKBA has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. RATANKBA has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines. [1] [2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 15 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	RATANKBA runs the `whoami` and `query user` commands.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	RATANKBA uses `netstat -ano` to search for specific IP address ranges.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command Shell Sub-technique	RATANKBA uses cmd.exe to execute commands.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1007	System Service Discovery	RATANKBA uses `tasklist /svc` to display running tasks.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web Protocols Sub-technique	RATANKBA uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1055.001	Dynamic-link Library Injection Sub-technique	RATANKBA performs a reflective DLL injection using a given pid.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1047	Windows Management Instrumentation	RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1087.001	Local Account Sub-technique	RATANKBA uses the `net user` command.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	RATANKBA lists the system’s processes.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	RATANKBA gathers the victim’s IP address via the `ipconfig -all` command.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1018	Remote System Discovery	RATANKBA runs the `net view /domain` and `net view` commands.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1012	Query Registry	RATANKBA uses the command `reg query “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings”`.CitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	RATANKBA uploads and downloads information.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShell Sub-technique	There is a variant of RATANKBA that uses a PowerShell script instead of the traditional PE form.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	RATANKBA gathers information about the OS architecture, OS name, and OS version/Service pack.CitationLazarus RATANKBACitationRATANKBA

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.1
Created: Oct 17, 2018, 00:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 29a4dcced5895ab2...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	May 18, 2026, 07:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`29a4dcced589…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Lazarus RATANKBA

Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
Open source URL
[2]
RATANKBA

Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
Open source URL
[3]
mitre-attack S0241
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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