Campaigns

Cutting Edge was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN appliances. Cutting Edge targeted the U.S. defense industrial base and multiple sectors globally including telecommunications, financial, aerospace, and technology. Cutting Edge featured the use of defense evasion and living-off-the-land (LoTL) techniques along with the deployment of web shells and other custom malware.[1][2][3][4][5]

FLORAHOX Activity is conducted using a hybrid operational relay box (ORB) network, which combines two types of infrastructure: compromised devices and leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS). The compromised devices include end-of-life routers and IoT devices, while VPS space is commercially leased and managed by ORB network administrators. This hybrid ORB network allows adversaries to proxy and obscure malicious traffic, making the source of the traffic more difficult to trace.

The FLORAHOX ORB network has been leveraged by multiple cyber threat actors, including China-nexus actors like ZIRCONIUM. These adversaries conduct espionage campaigns through FLORAHOX Activity, relying on the ORB network's ability to funnel traffic through Tor nodes, provisioned VPS servers, and compromised routers to obfuscate malicious traffic.[1]

Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.[1]

FrostyGoop Incident took place in January 2024 against a municipal district heating company in Ukraine. Following initial access via likely exploitation of external facing services, FrostyGoop was used to manipulate ENCO control systems via legitimate Modbus commands to impact the delivery of heating services to Ukrainian civilians.[1][2]

FrostyGoop Incident took place in January 2024 against a municipal district heating company in Ukraine. Following initial access via likely exploitation of external facing services, FrostyGoop was used to manipulate ENCO control systems via legitimate Modbus commands to impact the delivery of heating services to Ukrainian civilians.[1][2]

FunnyDream was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the FunnyDream campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the Chinoxy backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group.[1][2][3]

HomeLand Justice was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established as early as May 2021, and threat actors moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the destructive phase of the operation. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front, which framed the campaign as retaliation against the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group with a presence in Albania. Multiple Iran-nexus groups are assessed to have participated in the campaign, including HEXANE who probed victim infrastructure.[1][2][3] A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics following public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.[3]

Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions is a sequence of intrusions from 2021 through early 2022 linked to People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actors, particularly RedEcho and Threat Activity Group 38 (TAG38). The intrusions appear focused on IT system breach in Indian electric utility entities and logistics firms, as well as potentially managed service providers operating within India. Although focused on OT-operating entities, there is no evidence this campaign was able to progress beyond IT breach and information gathering to OT environment access.[1][2]

The J-magic Campaign was active from mid-2023 to at least mid-2024 and featured the use of the J-magic backdoor, a custom cd00r variant tailored for use against Juniper routers. The J-magic Campaign targeted Junos OS routers serving as VPN gateways primarily in the semiconductor, energy, manufacturing, and IT sectors. [1]

Juicy Mix was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2022 that targeted Israeli organizations with the Mango backdoor.[1]

KV Botnet Activity consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. KV Botnet Activity was used by Volt Typhoon to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster.[1] This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.[2]

Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.[1]

Maroochy Water Breach was an incident in 2000 where an adversary leveraged the local government’s wastewater control system and stolen engineering equipment to disrupt and eventually release 800,000 liters of raw sewage into the local community.[1]

Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]

Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion was a cyber incident involving a water treatment facility in Florida. During this incident, unidentified threat actors leveraged features of the system to access and modify setpoints for a specific chemical required in the treatment process. The incident was detected immediately and prevented before it could cause any harm to the public.[1][2][3]

Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]

Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]

Operation Digital Eye was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. Operation Digital Eye activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operation Soft Cell and Operation Tainted Love, indicate the potential use of shared vendors or digital quartermasters.[1]

Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.[1]

Operation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign "Honeybee" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.[1]

Operation MidnightEclipse was a campaign conducted in March and April 2024 that involved initial exploit of zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-3400, a critical command injection vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS.[1][2]

Operation Sharpshooter was a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted nuclear, defense, government, energy, and financial companies, with many located in Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Security researchers noted the campaign shared many similarities with previous Lazarus Group operations, including fake job recruitment lures and shared malware code.[1][2][3]