G1042: RedEcho
Analyst context for executives and security teams
RedEcho matters because MITRE describes it as a PRC-related group associated with long-running intrusions in Indian critical infrastructure entities, with links to ShadowPad use through shared infrastructure. For leaders, the defensive value is not to over-focus on the group name, but to test whether critical infrastructure and operationally important environments can see and disrupt the command-and-control patterns ATT&CK associates with this activity.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a resilience and evidence-readiness issue for organizations with critical infrastructure exposure, regional relevance, or dependencies on Indian power-sector operations. Executives should ask whether SOC, incident response, network security, and asset owners can prove visibility into web-based command and control, dynamic infrastructure, unusual protocol/port pairings, and encrypted outbound traffic. The object does not provide a formal detection section, so coverage should be validated through local telemetry rather than assumed from threat intelligence naming.
Technical view
MITRE links RedEcho to ShadowPad and to command-and-control/resource-development techniques including Web Protocols, Dynamic Resolution, Non-Standard Port, Asymmetric Cryptography, and acquired Domains. SOC and detection teams should validate outbound network monitoring, DNS/domain intelligence workflows, proxy and firewall logging, TLS/flow metadata, and malware-response playbooks for ShadowPad-relevant investigations. Because the RedEcho object itself does not specify platforms or tactics, detection engineering should be driven by the related techniques and by local critical-asset network paths.
Likely telemetry
- DNS queries, resolver logs, passive DNS, and domain registration/context data
- Proxy, web gateway, firewall, and outbound connection logs
- NetFlow or equivalent network flow records showing destination, port, protocol, and session patterns
- TLS/SSL metadata where collected, including certificate and handshake context
- Endpoint and malware investigation telemetry relevant to ShadowPad on Windows where applicable
Detection direction
- Validate alerts for web-protocol C2 patterns without relying only on known indicators, since web traffic can blend with normal operations.
- Look for protocol and port mismatches or uncommon outbound ports, while tuning for legitimate administrative, industrial, and vendor-support traffic.
- Review DNS and domain-monitoring coverage for dynamic or newly acquired infrastructure, including gaps in passive DNS, resolver logging, and egress allowlisting.
- Assess whether encrypted C2 would still leave usable metadata such as destination reputation, certificate anomalies, flow timing, or beacon-like behavior.
- Use the ShadowPad relationship as an investigation pivot, but avoid assuming every ShadowPad-related lead is RedEcho without corroborating intelligence.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with critical asset mapping and egress control: know which systems should communicate externally and restrict unnecessary outbound paths.
- Strengthen DNS, proxy, firewall, and network-flow retention so incident responders can reconstruct command-and-control activity.
- Apply segmentation and monitored choke points around operationally important environments and critical infrastructure dependencies.
- Maintain malware response procedures for ShadowPad-relevant findings, including containment, scoping, and infrastructure pivoting.
- Use threat intelligence on domains and infrastructure as supporting context, not as the only control, because dynamic resolution and non-standard ports can reduce simple blocklist effectiveness.
Analyst notes and limits
The decision value is in validating C2 visibility and response readiness around critical infrastructure environments. ATT&CK provides a group description, cited external reporting, and relationships to ShadowPad and several C2/resource-development techniques, but no official detection guidance for the group itself.
The supplied RedEcho object does not specify platforms, tactics, labels, or official detection content. Relationship platforms and tactics come from the related software and techniques, not from the RedEcho group object directly. Local environment evidence is required to determine exposure, relevance, and detection coverage.
RedEcho
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution | RedEcho used dynamic DNS domains associated with malicious infrastructure.CitationRecordedFuture RedEcho 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols Sub-technique | RedEcho network activity is associated with SSL traffic via TCP 443 and proxied HTTP traffic over non-standard ports.CitationRecordedFuture RedEcho 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | RedEcho has used non-standard ports such as TCP 8080 for HTTP communication.CitationRecordedFuture RedEcho 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric Cryptography Sub-technique | RedEcho uses SSL for network communication.CitationRecordedFuture RedEcho 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1583.001 | Domains Sub-technique | RedEcho has registered domains spoofing Indian critical infrastructure entities.CitationRecordedFuture RedEcho 2021 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0596: ShadowPad
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2849a4bd31a7… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
RecordedFuture RedEcho 2021
Recorded Future Insikt Group. (2021, February). China-Linked Group RedEcho Targets the Indian Power Sector Amid Heightened Border Tensions. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
Open source URL -
[2]
RecordedFuture RedEcho 2022
Recorded Future Insikt Group. (2022, April 6). Continued Targeting of Indian Power Grid Assets by Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
Open source URL -
[3]
mitre-attack G1042Open source URL
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