T1648: Serverless Execution
Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers.
Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking).[1] Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.[2][3]
Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.[4] This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.[5][6] In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.[7][8]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1648: Serverless Execution describes Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack...
Executive priority
T1648: Serverless Execution is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1648: Serverless Execution by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (execution), supported platforms (SaaS, IaaS, Office Suite), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
- Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1648: Serverless Execution appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Serverless Execution
Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers.
Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking).[1] Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.[2][3]
Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.[4] This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.[5][6] In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.[7][8]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1091: Pacu
Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 63cc9978d50c… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 63cc9978d50c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Cado Security Denonia
Matt Muir. (2022, April 6). Cado Discovers Denonia: The First Malware Specifically Targeting Lambda. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
Rhino Security Labs. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation
Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]Backdooring an AWS account
Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration
Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [6]Microsoft DART Case Report 001
Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [7]Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script
HackTricks Cloud. (n.d.). GWS - App Scripts. Retrieved July 1, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024
L'Hutereau Arnaud. (n.d.). Google Workspace Malicious App Script analysis. Retrieved October 2, 2024.
Open source URL - [9]mitre-attackT1648Open source URL
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