LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1590.002: DNS

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.[1]

Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via DNS/Passive DNS. DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).[2][3] Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Active Scanning), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).

Adversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.[4][5][6]

EnterpriseT1590.002Sub-techniqueObject v1.2Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1590.002: DNS describes Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records) Adversaries may gather this information in various ...

Executive priority

T1590.002: DNS is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1590.002: DNS by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (reconnaissance), supported platforms (PRE), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1590.002: DNS appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DNS

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.[1]

Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via DNS/Passive DNS. DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).[2][3] Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Active Scanning), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).

Adversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.[4][5][6]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1590Gather Victim Network InformationThis object subtechnique of Gather Victim Network Information.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM1054: Software ConfigurationEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1590: Gather Victim Network InformationEnterprisedetects · Detection StrategyDET0843: Detection of DNSEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1054: Software Configuration

Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats. These changes help reduce the attack surface, enforce best practices, and protect sensitive data. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Conduct a Security Review of Application Settings:

- Review the software documentation to identify recommended security configurations. - Compare default settings against organizational policies and compliance requirements.

Implement Access Controls and Permissions:

- Restrict access to sensitive features or data within the software. - Enforce least privilege principles for all roles and accounts interacting with the software.

Enable Logging and Monitoring:

- Configure detailed logging for key application events such as authentication failures, configuration changes, or unusual activity. - Integrate logs with a centralized monitoring solution, such as a SIEM.

Update and Patch Software Regularly:

- Ensure the software is kept up-to-date with the latest security patches to address known vulnerabilities. - Use automated patch management tools to streamline the update process.

Disable Unnecessary Features or Services:

- Turn off unused functionality or components that could introduce vulnerabilities, such as debugging interfaces or deprecated APIs.

Test Configuration Changes:

- Perform configuration changes in a staging environment before applying them in production. - Conduct regular audits to ensure that settings remain aligned with security policies.

*Tools for Implementation*

Configuration Management Tools:

- Ansible: Automates configuration changes across multiple applications and environments. - Chef: Ensures consistent application settings through code-based configuration management. - Puppet: Automates software configurations and audits changes for compliance.

Security Benchmarking Tools:

- CIS-CAT: Provides benchmarks and audits for secure software configurations. - Aqua Security Trivy: Scans containerized applications for configuration issues.

Vulnerability Management Solutions:

- Nessus: Identifies misconfigurations and suggests corrective actions.

Logging and Monitoring Tools:

- Splunk: Aggregates and analyzes application logs to detect suspicious activity.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
61ad1c75ace4f189...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle61ad1c75ace4…
19.11.2Older bundle61ad1c75ace4…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records

    Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    DNS Dumpster

    Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Circl Passive DNS

    CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Trails-DNS

    SecurityTrails. (2018, March 14). Wrong Bind Configuration Exposes the Complete List of Russian TLD's to the Internet. Retrieved June 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    DNS-CISA

    CISA. (2016, September 29). DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Leak Domain Information. Retrieved June 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Alexa-dns

    Scanning Alexa's Top 1M for AXFR. (2015, March 29). Retrieved June 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackT1590.002
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use