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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions

Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.[1]

When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).[2] Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.[3]

Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.[4]

Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.[5]

Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct Persistence and/or Privilege Escalation on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

EnterpriseT1547.006Sub-techniqueObject v1.4Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions describes Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mi...

Executive priority

T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (macOS, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Kernel Modules and Extensions

Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.[1]

When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).[2] Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.[3]

Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.[4]

Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.[5]

Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct Persistence and/or Privilege Escalation on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionThis object subtechnique of Boot or Logon Autostart Execution.
EnterpriseT1215Kernel Modules and ExtensionsKernel Modules and Extensions revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1219: REPTILE

REPTILE is an open-source Linux rootkit with multiple components that provides backdoor access and functionality.[1]

Linux
CampaignEnterprise

C0012: Operation CuckooBees

Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7a77549b7a456603...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundle7a77549b7a45…
19.11.4Older bundle7a77549b7a45…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Linux Kernel Programming

    Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide

    Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    iDefense Rootkit Overview

    Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    System and kernel extensions in macOS

    Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation

    Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Volatility Phalanx2

    Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit

    Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    GitHub Reptile

    Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    GitHub Diamorphine

    Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle

    Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken

    Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Securelist Ventir

    Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Trend Micro Skidmap

    Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Apple Developer Configuration Profile

    Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs

    Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Purves Kextpocalypse 2

    Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s

    Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module

    Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    mitre-attackT1547.006
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.