T1127.002: ClickOnce
Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.[1] ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.[2]
Because ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install.[3] As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges.
ClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on User Execution. When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.[4]
Adversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a Rundll32 script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.[5]
Additionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user’s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).[1][6]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1127.002: ClickOnce describes Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat) ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the app...
Executive priority
T1127.002: ClickOnce is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1127.002: ClickOnce by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth, execution), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1127.002: ClickOnce appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
ClickOnce
Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.[1] ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.[2]
Because ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install.[3] As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges.
ClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on User Execution. When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.[4]
Adversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a Rundll32 script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.[5]
Additionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user’s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).[1][6]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1127 | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | This object subtechnique of Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution. |
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 02cbe4371d0e… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 02cbe4371d0e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat
William Joseph Burke III. (2019, August 7). CLICKONCE AND YOU’RE IN: When .appref-ms abuse is operating as intended. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]SpectorOps Medium ClickOnce
Nick Powers. (2023, June 7). Less SmartScreen More Caffeine: (Ab)Using ClickOnce for Trusted Code Execution. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Microsoft Learn ClickOnce
Microsoft. (2023, September 14). ClickOnce security and deployment. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]NetSPI ClickOnce
Ryan Gandrud. (2015, March 23). All You Need Is One – A ClickOnce Love Story. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]LOLBAS /Dfsvc.exe
LOLBAS. (n.d.). /Dfsvc.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]Burke/CISA ClickOnce Paper
William J. Burke IV. (n.d.). Appref-ms Abuse for Code Execution & C2. Retrieved September 9, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1127.002Open source URL
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