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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1027.014: Polymorphic Code

Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution.[1] With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools.[2] Other obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as Software Packing, Command Obfuscation, or Encrypted/Encoded File.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1027.014Sub-techniqueObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1027.014: Polymorphic Code describes Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution.(Citation: polymorphic-blackberry) With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware too...

Executive priority

T1027.014: Polymorphic Code is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1027.014: Polymorphic Code by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth), supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1027.014: Polymorphic Code appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Polymorphic Code

Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution.[1] With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools.[2] Other obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as Software Packing, Command Obfuscation, or Encrypted/Encoded File.[3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or InformationThis object subtechnique of Obfuscated Files or Information.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0574: BendyBear

BendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b1837167de060be5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundleb1837167de06…
19.12.0Older bundleb1837167de06…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    polymorphic-blackberry

    Blackberry. (n.d.). What is Polymorphic Malware?. Retrieved September 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    polymorphic-sentinelone

    SentinelOne. (2023, March 18). What is Polymorphic Malware? Examples and Challenges. Retrieved September 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    polymorphic-linkedin

    Sherwin Akshay. (2024, May 28). Techniques for concealing malware and hindering analysis: Packing up and unpacking stuff. Retrieved September 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    polymorphic-medium

    Shellseekercyber. (2024, January 7). Explainer: Packed Malware. Retrieved September 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackT1027.014
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.