T1003.006: DCSync
Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)CitationMicrosoft DRSR Dec 2017 CitationMicrosoft GetNCCChanges CitationSamba DRSUAPI CitationWine API samlib.dll to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.
Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password dataCitationADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the TicketCitationHarmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.CitationInsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz.CitationGitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.CitationMicrosoft NRPC Dec 2017
Security context for executives and security teams
T1003.006: DCSync describes Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to...
Executive priority
T1003.006: DCSync is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1003.006: DCSync by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1003.006: DCSync appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
DCSync
Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)CitationMicrosoft DRSR Dec 2017 CitationMicrosoft GetNCCChanges CitationSamba DRSUAPI CitationWine API samlib.dll to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.
Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password dataCitationADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the TicketCitationHarmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.CitationInsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz.CitationGitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.CitationMicrosoft NRPC Dec 2017
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
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