T0877: I/O Image
Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. [1] The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.
The Input and Output Image tables described above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. [2]
Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLCs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.
Security context for executives and security teams
T0877: I/O Image describes Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the correspo...
Executive priority
T0877: I/O Image is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T0877: I/O Image by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T0877: I/O Image appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
I/O Image
Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. [1] The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.
The Input and Output Image tables described above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. [2]
Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLCs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0603: Stuxnet
Stuxnet was the first publicly reported malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex malware that utilized multiple behaviors, including numerous zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.[1][2][3][4] Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | a246d8ad038e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | a246d8ad038e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath
Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11
Open source URL - [2]Spenneberg, Ralf 2016
Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackT0877Open source URL
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