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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9067: TWOSTROKE

TWOSTROKE is malicious backdoor written in C++ that is capable of discovery actions, executing payloads and exfiltrating data.[1] TWOSTROKE was first observed in 2025 and has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]

EnterpriseS9067MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S9067: TWOSTROKE describes [TWOSTROKE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9067) is malicious backdoor written in C++ that is capable of discovery actions, executing payloads and exfiltrating data.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025) [TWOSTROKE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9067) was first observed in 2025 and has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group [NIMBUS MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059).(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)

Executive priority

S9067: TWOSTROKE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9067: TWOSTROKE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S9067: TWOSTROKE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TWOSTROKE

TWOSTROKE is malicious backdoor written in C++ that is capable of discovery actions, executing payloads and exfiltrating data.[1] TWOSTROKE was first observed in 2025 and has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

13 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

TWOSTROKE has gathered victim hostname and the domain through `GetComputerNameExW(ComputerNameDnsFullyQualified)`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

TWOSTROKE has encrypted gathered device data with XOR and a static key.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

TWOSTROKE has encoded its payloads with hex and separates values with `@##@`.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

TWOSTROKE can execute shell commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

TWOSTROKE has the ability to delete files.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

TWOSTROKE has downloaded files from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

TWOSTROKE has been deployed using DLL search order hijacking.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

TWOSTROKE has leveraged Windows API calls to gather system information using `GetComputerNameExW(ComputerNameDnsFullyQualified)`.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

TWOSTROKE has gathered the full victim name.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

TWOSTROKE has the ability list the directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

TWOSTROKE has utilized valid digital signatures to evade detection from security tools.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

TWOSTROKE can exfiltrate data over C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

TWOSTROKE has utilized SSL encrypted C2 over TCP port 443.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1059: NIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE is a State Sponsored cyber espionage group associated with the Iranian Regime specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). NIMBUS MANTICORE has employed social engineering attacks to include HR related themes and has leveraged custom malware against its victims. NIMBUS MANTICORE has sought sensitive information in victims’ environments to include network/IT documentation, intellectual property and emails. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also leveraged compromised organizations as pivot points to access other organizations of interest. NIMBUS MANTICORE has been active since 2021 and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations to include aviation, aerospace, telecommunications and defense and information technology related organizations within the United States, Australia, Midde East and Europe.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · GroupG1059: NIMBUS MANTICOREEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2d25e60432a93e22...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle2d25e60432a9…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025

    El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS9067
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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