S9063: DEEPROOT
Security context for executives and security teams
S9063: DEEPROOT describes [DEEPROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9063) is a Linux backdoor written in Golang.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025) [DEEPROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9063) is able to execute commands via a shell, enumerate systems, delete or download files, and exfiltrate data.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025) [DEEPROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9063) was first observed in 2025.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025) [DEEPROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9063) has been affiliated with the c...
Executive priority
S9063: DEEPROOT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9063: DEEPROOT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9063: DEEPROOT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
DEEPROOT
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1678 | Delay Execution | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1059: NIMBUS MANTICORE
NIMBUS MANTICORE is a State Sponsored cyber espionage group associated with the Iranian Regime specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). NIMBUS MANTICORE has employed social engineering attacks to include HR related themes and has leveraged custom malware against its victims. NIMBUS MANTICORE has sought sensitive information in victims’ environments to include network/IT documentation, intellectual property and emails. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also leveraged compromised organizations as pivot points to access other organizations of interest. NIMBUS MANTICORE has been active since 2021 and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations to include aviation, aerospace, telecommunications and defense and information technology related organizations within the United States, Australia, Midde East and Europe.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 7f34f5db2a97… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025
El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9063Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.