S9012: TRAILBLAZE
TRAILBLAZE is an in-memory dropper used to deploy the passive backdoor BRUSHFIRE. First reported in March 2025, TRAILBLAZE has been observed in operations attributed to People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored affiliated actors, including UNC5221 and SYLVANITE. [1][2][3]
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TRAILBLAZE
TRAILBLAZE is an in-memory dropper used to deploy the passive backdoor BRUSHFIRE. First reported in March 2025, TRAILBLAZE has been observed in operations attributed to People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored affiliated actors, including UNC5221 and SYLVANITE. [1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | TRAILBLAZE has conducted process discovery by searching for specific named processes such as `/home/bin/web`.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | TRAILBLAZE has the ability to delete temporary files and contents in specified directories to cover its tracks.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | TRAILBLAZE has injected a hook into an existing process to load BRUSHFIRE in the spaces allocated memory to include the Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) web process named `web`.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | TRAILBLAZE has leveraged raw syscalls to execute commands.[2][3] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 3b9ece31a6ac… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 3b9ece31a6ac… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 3b9ece31a6ac… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Dragos SYLVANITE MuddyWater Electrum March 2026
Dragos. (2026, March 24). Dragos 2026 OT Cybersecurity Report: Year in Review, O&G and Petrochemicals Focus. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025
John Wolfram, Michael Edie, Jacob Thompson, Matt Lin, Josh Murchie. (2025, April 3). Suspected China-Nexus Threat Actor Actively Exploiting Critical Ivanti Connect Secure Vulnerability (CVE-2025-22457). Retrieved April 13, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025
Sila Ozeren Hacioglu. (2025, May 5). UNC5221’s Latest Exploit: Weaponizing CVE-2025-22457 in Ivanti Connect Secure. Retrieved April 13, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS9012Open source URL
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