S1235: CorKLOG

CorKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. CorKLOG is delivered through a RAR archive (e.g., src.rar), which contains two files: an executable (lcommute.exe) and the CorKLOG DLL (mscorsvc.dll). CorKLOG has established persistence on the system by creating services or with scheduled tasks.[1]

EnterpriseS1235MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedOct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1235: CorKLOG describes [CorKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235) is a keylogger known to be leveraged by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and was first observed utilized in 2024. [CorKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235) is delivered through a RAR archive (e.g., src.rar), which contains two files: an executable (lcommute.exe) and the [CorKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235) DLL (mscorsvc.dll). [CorKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1235) has established persistence on the system by ...

Executive priority

S1235: CorKLOG is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1235: CorKLOG by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1235: CorKLOG appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

CorKLOG

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques8 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	CorKLOG has used legitimate signed binaries such as lcommute.exe for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL side-loading.[1]
Enterprise	T1056.001	KeyloggingSub-technique	CorKLOG has captured keystrokes.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	CorKLOG has decoded XOR encrypted strings.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	CorKLOG has created a service to establish persistence.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	CorKLOG has encrypted collected contents using RC4.[1] CorKLOG has also utilized XOR encrypted strings.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	CorKLOG has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	CorKLOG has achieved persistence through the creation of a scheduled task named TableInputServices by using the command `schtasks /create /tn TabletlnputServices /tr /sc minute /mo 10 /f`.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	CorKLOG has stored the captured data in an encrypted file using a 48-character RC4 key.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0129: Mustang PandaEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterprise

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Sep 12, 2025, 15:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 2996c8e18373a484...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
20.0	Oct 15, 2026, 20:21 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`2996c8e18373…`
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`2996c8e18373…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`2996c8e18373…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025
Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1235
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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