S1233: PAKLOG

PAKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. PAKLOG is deployed via a RAR archive (e.g., key.rar), which contains two files: a signed, legitimate binary (PACLOUD.exe) and the malicious PAKLOG DLL (pa_lang2.dll). The PACLOUD.exe binary is used to side-load the PAKLOG DLL which starts with the keylogger functionality.[1]

EnterpriseS1233MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedOct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1233: PAKLOG describes [PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) is a keylogger known to be leveraged by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and was first observed utilized in 2024. [PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) is deployed via a RAR archive (e.g., key.rar), which contains two files: a signed, legitimate binary (PACLOUD.exe) and the malicious [PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1233) DLL (pa_lang2.dll). The PACLOUD.exe binary is used to side-load the [PAKLOG](https://attack.mitre.org...

Executive priority

S1233: PAKLOG is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1233: PAKLOG by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1233: PAKLOG appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PAKLOG

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques10 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	PAKLOG has utilized a simple encoding mechanism to encode characters in the buffer.[1]
Enterprise	T1056.001	KeyloggingSub-technique	PAKLOG has captured keystrokes using Windows API.[1]
Enterprise	T1115	Clipboard Data	PAKLOG has monitored and extracted clipboard contents.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	PAKLOG has used Windows API `SetWindowsHookExW` with `idHook` set to `WH_KEYBOARD_LL` and a custom hook procedure to support its keylogging functions.[1]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	PAKLOG has used legitimate signed binaries such as PACLOUD.exe for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL Side-Loading.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	PAKLOG has stored the captured data in a file located `C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\record.txt`.[1]
Enterprise	T1010	Application Window Discovery	PAKLOG has used `GetForegroundWindow` to access the foreground window. [1] PAKLOG has also captured text from the foreground windows.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	PAKLOG has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	PAKLOG has detected and logged the full path of processes active in the foreground using Windows API calls.[1]
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	PAKLOG has collected a timestamp to log the precise time a key was pressed, formatted as %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Sep 12, 2025, 15:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 7cef7ad527f519da...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`7cef7ad527f5…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 21, 2025, 16:53 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`7cef7ad527f5…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025
Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: PAKLOG, CorKLOG, and SplatCloak | P2. Retrieved September 12, 2025.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1233
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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