S1225: CherryBlos
CherryBlos is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. CherryBlos was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind CherryBlos uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Mexico.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1225: CherryBlos describes [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, V...
Executive priority
S1225: CherryBlos is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1225: CherryBlos by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1225: CherryBlos appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CherryBlos
CherryBlos is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. CherryBlos was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind CherryBlos uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Mexico.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1541 | Foreground Persistence | CherryBlos has utilized foreground services by showing a notification to evade detection.[1] |
| Mobile | T1453 | Abuse Accessibility Features | After accessibility permissions are granted, CherryBlos has used the Accessibility Service to monitor when a wallet application launches and to steal credentials.[1] |
| Mobile | T1417 | Input Capture | CherryBlos has captured victims' credentials through predefined fake activities.[1] |
| Mobile | T1424 | Process Discovery | CherryBlos has used the Accessibility Service to monitor when a wallet application has launched.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | CherryBlos has obtained a list of installed cryptocurrency wallet applications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1660 | Phishing | CherryBlos has been distributed through the threat actors’ Telegram group, fake TikTok and Twitter accounts, and YouTube videos.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | CherryBlos has accessed media files stored in external storage and has used optical character recognition (OCR) to recognize potential mnemonic phrases in pictures.[1] |
| Mobile | T1629 | Impair Defenses | CherryBlos has sent the victim back to the home screen when the victim navigates to the malicious application's settings and has automatically approved any permission requests by clicking on the "Allow" button when a system dialogue appears.[1] |
| Mobile | T1646 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | CherryBlos has exfiltrated credentials collected from pictures that have been analyzed using optical character recognition (OCR).[1] |
| Mobile | T1406.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | CherryBlos has used a commercial packer named Jiagubao to evade static detection.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655 | Masquerading | CherryBlos has displayed masqueraded wallet applications if the EnabledUIMode field is set to `true`. CherryBlos has also displayed a fake user interface while victims make withdrawals in the legitimate Binance application if the EnableExchange field is set to `true`. The withdrawal transaction is ultimately transferred to the threat actor’s controlled address.[1] |
| Mobile | T1544 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CherryBlos has received configuration files from the C2 server.[1] |
| Mobile | T1437.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | CherryBlos has communicated with the C2 server using HTTPS.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | ea312dec6681… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | ea312dec6681… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | ea312dec6681… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023
Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 28). Related CherryBlos and FakeTrade Android Malware Involved in Scam Campaigns. Retrieved March 28, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1225Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.