S1225: CherryBlos
MITRE ATT&CK S1225: CherryBlos Malware details for Android, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
S1225: CherryBlos describes [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind [CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, V...
Executive priority
S1225: CherryBlos is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1225: CherryBlos by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1225: CherryBlos appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CherryBlos
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1541 | Foreground Persistence | This object uses Foreground Persistence. |
| Mobile | T1453 | Abuse Accessibility Features | This object uses Abuse Accessibility Features. |
| Mobile | T1417 | Input Capture | This object uses Input Capture. |
| Mobile | T1424 | Process Discovery | This object uses Process Discovery. |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | This object uses Software Discovery. |
| Mobile | T1660 | Phishing | This object uses Phishing. |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | This object uses File and Directory Discovery. |
| Mobile | T1629 | Impair Defenses | This object uses Impair Defenses. |
| Mobile | T1646 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | This object uses Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. |
| Mobile | T1406.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | This object uses Software Packing. |
| Mobile | T1655 | Masquerading | This object uses Masquerading. |
| Mobile | T1544 | Ingress Tool Transfer | This object uses Ingress Tool Transfer. |
| Mobile | T1437.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | This object uses Web Protocols. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | ea312dec6681… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | ea312dec6681… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023
Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 28). Related CherryBlos and FakeTrade Android Malware Involved in Scam Campaigns. Retrieved March 28, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1225Open source URL
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