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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1212: RansomHub

RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) offering with Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD versions that has been in use since at least 2024 to target organizations in multiple sectors globally. RansomHub operators may have purchased and rebranded resources from Knight (formerly Cyclops) Ransomware which shares infrastructure, feature, and code overlaps with RansomHub.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1212MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

RansomHub matters because ATT&CK describes it as a ransomware-as-a-service offering with Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD versions, and relationships show behaviors that span discovery, lateral movement over SMB/admin shares, execution through PowerShell and Windows command shell, defense impairment, recovery inhibition, and data encryption for impact. For leaders, the decision value is not just “ransomware exists”; it is whether the organization can see and contain the pre-impact behaviors before encryption, service disruption, log clearing, or recovery inhibition affect business continuity.

Executive priority

Prioritize RansomHub as an operational resilience and incident-readiness use case. The ATT&CK relationships point to risks that executives should ask about directly: Are critical Windows and Linux environments monitored? Are SMB/admin-share paths controlled? Can the SOC detect discovery and service-stop activity before impact? Are recovery mechanisms protected from tampering? Can incident responders still reconstruct activity if Windows Event Logs are cleared? This object is also useful for audit and board evidence because it maps ransomware risk to concrete control areas: identity and admin access, endpoint visibility, network-share governance, backup/recovery protection, and incident response logging.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage across the related behaviors rather than relying on a single ransomware signature. Key ATT&CK-linked areas include Remote System Discovery, Process Discovery, System Information Discovery, File and Directory Discovery, Network Share Discovery, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, PowerShell, Windows Command Shell, Proxy, Encrypted/Encoded File, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Execution Guardrails, Time Based Checks, Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder, File Deletion, Clear Windows Event Logs, Safe Mode Boot, Service Stop, Inhibit System Recovery, Internal Defacement, and Data Encrypted for Impact. Detection engineering should test whether telemetry survives privilege misuse, log clearing, safe mode boot behavior, service disruption, and backup/recovery tampering scenarios.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for PowerShell, cmd, discovery utilities, service-control actions, and recovery-inhibition commands
  • Windows Event Log collection, including evidence of log-clearing activity and gaps in expected log flow
  • SMB/admin-share access records, file-share enumeration, and lateral movement indicators from Windows systems
  • File-system telemetry for rapid file modification, deletion, creation of encrypted or encoded artifacts, and ransom-note or defacement-related changes where observable
  • Registry monitoring for Run Key and Startup Folder persistence on Windows

Detection direction

  • Correlate discovery behaviors with later SMB/admin-share access, command execution, service changes, and high-volume file activity; isolated discovery commands may be benign, but clustered sequencing increases investigative value.
  • Tune PowerShell and Windows command-shell detections for suspicious administrative use while accounting for legitimate IT automation and remote administration.
  • Validate that Windows Event Log clearing generates alerts from independent or forwarded telemetry, not only from the host whose logs may be cleared.
  • Test visibility for Safe Mode Boot and service-stop behavior because endpoint controls may have reduced function when services or drivers are not loaded.
  • Monitor recovery-inhibition activity as a high-priority ransomware precursor because it directly affects restoration options.

Mitigation priorities

  • First, protect recovery: ensure backup and recovery mechanisms are access-controlled, monitored, and resistant to deletion or disabling.
  • Second, reduce lateral movement exposure: limit SMB/admin-share use, review administrative account access, and validate least-privilege controls for remote shares.
  • Third, harden and monitor execution paths: govern PowerShell and Windows command-shell usage without breaking legitimate administration.
  • Fourth, improve logging resilience: forward logs off-host and verify alerts for Windows Event Log clearing, service stops, and safe mode related changes.
  • Fifth, strengthen endpoint and server coverage across Windows and Linux assets, with special attention to high-value file servers and systems supporting business continuity.
Additional notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK S1212 and its supplied relationships. The object has no official detection text and no ATT&CK tactics listed directly on the malware object, so defensive guidance is derived from the related techniques and official description. The relationships make this most useful as a ransomware behavior-chain validation case for SOC, IR, identity/admin-access review, backup resilience, and recovery readiness.

ATT&CK does not provide official detection guidance for this object in the supplied fields. Local command patterns, filenames, infrastructure indicators, affected sectors, and confirmed exposure are not provided here. Any determination of coverage or risk requires environment-specific telemetry validation, control testing, and incident-response evidence review.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RansomHub

RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) offering with Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD versions that has been in use since at least 2024 to target organizations in multiple sectors globally. RansomHub operators may have purchased and rebranded resources from Knight (formerly Cyclops) Ransomware which shares infrastructure, feature, and code overlaps with RansomHub.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

RansomHub can use PowerShell to delete volume shadow copies.[2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

RansomHub has the ability to self-delete.[2]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

RansomHub can use a proxy to connect to remote SFTP servers.[2]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

RansomHub will terminate without proceeding to encryption if the infected machine is on a list of allowlisted machines specified in its configuration.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

RansomHub has an encrypted configuration file.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

RansomHub has created an autorun Registry key through the `-safeboot-instance -pass` command line argument.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

RansomHub can use `cmd.exe` to execute multiple commands on infected hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

RansomHub can use a provided passphrase to decrypt its configuration file.[2]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

RansomHub can enumerate all accessible machines from the infected system.[2]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

RansomHub can use credentials provided in its configuration to move laterally from the infected machine over SMBv2.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

RansomHub can sleep for a set number of minutes before beginning execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

RansomHub can delete events from the Security, System, and Application logs.[2]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

RansomHub has used `vssadmin.exe` to delete volume shadow copies.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

RansomHub has the ability to only encrypt specific files.[2]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

RansomHub can use Elliptic Curve Encryption to encrypt files on targeted systems.[1] RansomHub can also skip content at regular intervals (ex. encrypt 1 MB, skip 3 MB) to optomize performance and enable faster encryption for large files.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1491.001Internal DefacementSub-technique

RansomHub has placed a ransom note on comrpomised systems to warn victims and provide directions for how to retrieve data.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

RansomHub has the ability to target specific network shares for encryption.[2]

EnterpriseT1688Safe Mode Boot

RansomHub can reboot targeted systems into Safe Mode prior to encryption.[2]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

RansomHub has the ability to terminate specified services.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin SharesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685.005: Clear Windows Event LogsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1491.001: Internal DefacementEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1688: Safe Mode BootEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1489: Service StopEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
aae116d3e5925aea...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundleaae116d3e592…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS1212
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS1212
    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS1212
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    CISA RansomHub AUG 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, August 29). #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025

    Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
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Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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