S1134: DEADWOOD

DEADWOOD is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. DEADWOOD was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into Agrius operations.[1]

EnterpriseS1134MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedAug 26, 2024, 18:34 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1134: DEADWOOD describes [DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. [DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)

Executive priority

S1134: DEADWOOD is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1134: DEADWOOD by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1134: DEADWOOD appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DEADWOOD

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques10 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1561.001	Disk Content WipeSub-technique	DEADWOOD deletes files following overwriting them with random data.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.009	Embedded PayloadsSub-technique	DEADWOOD contains an embedded, AES-encrypted payload labeled `METADATA` that provides configuration information for follow-on execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1485	Data Destruction	DEADWOOD overwrites files on victim systems with random data to effectively destroy them.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	DEADWOOD will attempt to masquerade its service execution using benign-looking names such as `ScDeviceEnums`.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	DEADWOOD contains an embedded, AES-encrypted resource named `METADATA` that contains configuration information for follow-on execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	DEADWOOD can be executed as a service using various names, such as `ScDeviceEnums`.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	DEADWOOD XORs some strings within the binary using the value `0xD5`, and deobfuscates these items at runtime.[1]
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	DEADWOOD will set a timestamp value to determine when wiping functionality starts. When the timestamp is met on the system, a trigger file is created on the operating system allowing for execution to proceed. If the timestamp is in the past, the wiper will execute immediately.[1]
Enterprise	T1531	Account Access Removal	DEADWOOD changes the password for local and domain users via `net.exe` to a random 32 character string to prevent these accounts from logging on. Additionally, DEADWOOD will terminate the `winlogon.exe` process to prevent attempts to log on to the infected system.[1]
Enterprise	T1561.002	Disk Structure WipeSub-technique	DEADWOOD opens and writes zeroes to the first 512 bytes of each drive, deleting the MBR. DEADWOOD then sends the control code `IOCTL_DISK_DELETE_DRIVE_LAYOUT` to ensure the MBR is removed from the drive.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1030: Agrius

Agrius is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets.[1][2] Public reporting has linked Agrius to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[3]

G0064: APT33

APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: May 22, 2024, 21:27 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Aug 26, 2024, 18:34 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 88d973d03d7d66b1...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Aug 26, 2024, 18:34 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`88d973d03d7d…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Aug 26, 2024, 18:34 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`88d973d03d7d…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
SentinelOne Agrius 2021
Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1134
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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