S1117: GLASSTOKEN
GLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1117: GLASSTOKEN describes [GLASSTOKEN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1117) is a custom web shell used by threat actors during [Cutting Edge](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0029) to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024)
Executive priority
S1117: GLASSTOKEN is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1117: GLASSTOKEN by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1117: GLASSTOKEN appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
GLASSTOKEN
GLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | GLASSTOKEN can use PowerShell for command execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | GLASSTOKEN has the ability to decode hexadecimal and Base64 C2 requests.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | GLASSTOKEN is a web shell capable of tunneling C2 connections and code execution on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | GLASSTOKEN has hexadecimal and Base64 encoded C2 content.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0029: Cutting Edge
Cutting Edge was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN appliances. Cutting Edge targeted the U.S. defense industrial base and multiple sectors globally including telecommunications, financial, aerospace, and technology. Cutting Edge featured the use of defense evasion and living-off-the-land (LoTL) techniques along with the deployment of web shells and other custom malware.[1][2][3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | e38707c09c8e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | e38707c09c8e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024
Meltzer, M. et al. (2024, January 10). Active Exploitation of Two Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN. Retrieved February 27, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1117Open source URL
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