S1096: Cheerscrypt
Cheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1096: Cheerscrypt describes [Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) is a ransomware that was developed by [Cinnamon Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1021) and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. [Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) was derived from the leaked [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/so...
Executive priority
S1096: Cheerscrypt is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1096: Cheerscrypt by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, ESXi), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1096: Cheerscrypt appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Cheerscrypt
Cheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | Cheerscrypt has the ability to terminate VM processes on compromised hosts through execution of `esxcli vm process kill`.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.012 | Hypervisor CLISub-technique | Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli` in order to terminate running virtual machines.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Cheerscrypt can encrypt data on victim machines using a Sosemanuk stream cipher with an Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) generated key.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Cheerscrypt can search for log and VMware-related files with .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, and .vmsn extensions.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1673 | Virtual Machine Discovery | Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli vm process list` in order to gather a list of running virtual machines to terminate them.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1021: Cinnamon Tempest
Cinnamon Tempest is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2021 deploying multiple strains of ransomware based on the leaked Babuk source code. Cinnamon Tempest does not operate their ransomware on an affiliate model or purchase access but appears to act independently in all stages of the attack lifecycle. Based on victimology, the short lifespan of each ransomware variant, and use of malware attributed to government-sponsored threat groups, Cinnamon Tempest may be motivated by intellectual property theft or cyberespionage rather than financial gain.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 9b5e7e80c09f… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 9b5e7e80c09f… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 9b5e7e80c09f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022
Biderman, O. et al. (2022, October 3). REVEALING EMPEROR DRAGONFLY: NIGHT SKY AND CHEERSCRYPT - A SINGLE RANSOMWARE GROUP. Retrieved December 6, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022
Dela Cruz, A. et al. (2022, May 25). New Linux-Based Ransomware Cheerscrypt Targeting ESXi Devices Linked to Leaked Babuk Source Code. Retrieved December 19, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1096Open source URL
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