S0610: SideTwist
Security context for executives and security teams
S0610: SideTwist describes [SideTwist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0610) is a C-based backdoor that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) since at least 2021.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Executive priority
S0610: SideTwist is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0610: SideTwist by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0610: SideTwist appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SideTwist
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | |
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1001 | Data Obfuscation |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 66428b9cc341… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 66428b9cc341… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 66428b9cc341… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Check Point APT34 April 2021
Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0610Open source URL
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