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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0438: Attor

Attor is a Windows-based espionage platform that has been seen in use since 2013. Attor has a loadable plugin architecture to customize functionality for specific targets.[1]

EnterpriseS0438MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0438: Attor describes [Attor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438) is a Windows-based espionage platform that has been seen in use since 2013. [Attor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0438) has a loadable plugin architecture to customize functionality for specific targets.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)

Executive priority

S0438: Attor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0438: Attor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0438: Attor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Attor

Attor is a Windows-based espionage platform that has been seen in use since 2013. Attor has a loadable plugin architecture to customize functionality for specific targets.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

35 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Attor has a plugin that enumerates files with specific extensions on all hard disk drives and stores file information in encrypted log files.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

Attor encrypts collected data with a custom implementation of Blowfish and RSA ciphers.[1]

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

Attor can obtain application window titles and then determines which windows to perform Screen Capture on.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Attor has encrypted data symmetrically using a randomly generated Blowfish (OFB) key which is encrypted with a public RSA key.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Attor's dispatcher disguises itself as a legitimate task (i.e., the task name and description appear legitimate).[1]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts, such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

Attor has used Tor for C2 communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Sub-technique

Attor's dispatcher can establish persistence via adding a Registry key with a logon script HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment "UserInitMprLogonScript" .[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Attor's installer plugin can schedule rundll32.exe to load the dispatcher.[1]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

Attor has a plugin that collects data stored in the Windows clipboard by using the OpenClipboard and GetClipboardData APIs.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Attor's Blowfish key is encrypted with a public RSA key.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Attor can download additional plugins, updates and other files. [1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

Attor has a plugin that collects information about inserted storage devices, modems, and phone devices.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Attor's dispatcher can modify the Run registry key.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Attor's has a plugin that captures screenshots of the target applications.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Attor has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1129Shared Modules

Attor's dispatcher can execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Attor's dispatcher can establish persistence by registering a new service.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Strings in Attor's components are encrypted with a XOR cipher, using a hardcoded key and the configuration data, log files and plugins are encrypted using a hybrid encryption scheme of Blowfish-OFB combined with RSA.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique

Attor has used FTP protocol for C2 communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Attor has automatically collected data about the compromised system.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Attor's installer plugin can schedule a new task that loads the dispatcher on boot/logon.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

Attor has manipulated the time of last access to files and registry keys after they have been created or modified.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Attor's dispatcher can inject itself into running processes to gain higher privileges and to evade detection.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

One of Attor's plugins can collect user credentials via capturing keystrokes and can capture keystrokes pressed within the window of the injected process.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Attor's dispatcher can be executed as a service.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Attor can set attributes of log files and directories to HIDDEN, SYSTEM, ARCHIVE, or a combination of those.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Attor’s plugin deletes the collected files and log files after exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

Attor's has a plugin that is capable of recording audio using available input sound devices.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Attor's dispatcher has used CreateProcessW API for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1020Automated Exfiltration

Attor has a file uploader plugin that automatically exfiltrates the collected data and log files to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallSub-technique

Attor performs the injection by attaching its code into the APC queue using NtQueueApcThread API.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Attor monitors the free disk space on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Attor has opened the registry and performed query searches.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.003: Archive via Custom MethodEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1010: Application Window DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.004: Masquerade Task or ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.003: Multi-hop ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1037.001: Logon Script (Windows)Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1115: Clipboard DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1120: Peripheral Device DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1129: Shared ModulesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.002: File Transfer ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
101444c4e97e16e2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle101444c4e97e…
19.11.1Older bundle101444c4e97e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Attor Oct 2019

    Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Attor

    (Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0438
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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